Raymond McGovern is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, serving from 1963 to 1990.
His CIA career began under President John F. Kennedy and lasted through the presidency of George H. W. Bush. McGovern advised Henry Kissinger during the Richard Nixon administration, and during the Ronald Reagan administration he chaired National Intelligence Estimates and prepared the President's Daily Brief.
He received the Intelligence Commendation Medal at his retirement but returned it in 2006 to protest the CIA's involvement in torture.
Steve and Ray discuss:
0:00 Introduction
01:25 Ray McGovern's assessment of the JFK assassination
26:10 Hunter Biden's laptop
30:50 Ukraine and the U.S. intelligence services' role in the deep state
55:20 Strategic implications of the Ukraine war for the U.S.
I've been asked to write something about PRC military buildup and a potential Taiwan (TW) conflict.
1. My perspective and bona fides: My father was a KMT officer, my mother's father was a KMT general and that side of the family is related to Chiang Kai Shek by marriage. I have relatives both in PRC and TW. My wife is a graduate of National Taiwan University. I should be biased in favor of TW and against CPC but I am a realist and rationalist so I call things as I see them.
2. PRC military technology has reached parity with the US and, overall, surpassed Russia. PLARF (dedicated rocket forces) may be decisive in a conflict in the pacific. They may have achieved A2AD and can make it very costly for the US navy to operate anywhere near TW.
3. Specifically, long range missile attack on surface ships, using initial targeting via satellites and drones, and final targeting from sensors on the missile itself, is probably a mature technology now and difficult to defeat with countermeasures / missile defense.
4. US estimates of PRC nuclear weapons stockpile have barely changed in 30y and are likely highly unreliable. Based on production capabilities alone they may already have ~1000 warheads (if not now, in a few years), and the ability to target the entire US. PRC is building up its arsenal to ensure that the US understands that they have a reliable MAD capability.
5. PRC can easily blockade TW if desired, and (at cost of significant escalation) can probably also blockade Japan and S. Korea as well. All of these countries import ~90% of energy and ~50% of food calories, so a protracted blockade would have serious impact.
6. I don’t believe PRC has near term plans to invade TW, but they have to maintain the capability to deter any change in the status quo. Both sides prefer the status quo but accidents can happen.
7. Thanks to stupid US strategy re: Ukraine, PRC can rely on Russian energy in the future and will become much more resistant to naval blockade (e.g., of oil supplies transiting the Malacca Strait). In other words, dumb US neocons solved PRC’s energy security problem for them.
No one talks about this because US strategy has been brain dead for a long time. No one even talks, in the immediate aftermath, about the trillions of dollars and millions of lives wasted over 20y in the Iraq/Afghanistan tragedies. Cui bono?
8. PRC spends a smaller fraction of GDP on defense than the US, but because they have mastered the entire military technology stack cost estimates should be PPP adjusted. After PPP adjustment the PRC economy is substantially larger than the US economy. This, plus the fact that their manufacturing capacity (e.g., ship building) is far beyond that of the US, means that their overall capability to produce war materiel (i.e., to engage in a rapid buildup on, e.g., a 5y timescale) has easily surpassed ours. Anyone following their recent naval or air power or missile or satellite build up can see that this is the case.
I'll be discussing some of these topics with Lyle Goldstein (US Naval War College, Watson China Initiative at Brown University; BA Harvard, PhD Princeton) in a future podcast.
See also this documentary produced by the US Army University Press. Queued to start at discussion of missile technology and nuclear weapons.
Theodore A. Postol is professor emeritus of Science, Technology, and International Security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is widely known as an expert on nuclear weapons and missile technology.
Educated in physics and nuclear engineering at MIT, he was a researcher at Argonne National Lab, worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and was scientific advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations.
After leaving the Pentagon, Postol helped to build a program at Stanford University to train mid-career scientists to study weapons technology in relation to defense and arms control policy.
He has received numerous awards, including the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society for "incisive technical analysis of national security issues that [have] been vital for informing the public policy debate", the Norbert Wiener Award from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for "uncovering numerous and important false claims about missile defenses", and the Richard L. Garwin Award "that recognizes an individual who, through exceptional achievement in science and technology, has made an outstanding contribution toward the benefit of mankind."
Steve and Ted discuss:
0:00 Introduction
2:02 Early life in Brooklyn, education at MIT, work at the Pentagon
20:27 Reagan’s “Star Wars” defense plan
28:26 U.S. influence on Russia and China’s second-strike capabilities
Ted Postol: ... So, you've got to listen to Putin's voice dispassionately. And when you listen to him, he makes it clear numerous times, numerous times that he doesn't think American missile defense is a worth anything, but he also is worried about an American president who might believe otherwise, and who might take steps against Russia, that would then lead to an action-reaction cycle that would get us, get us all killed.
In other words, he's not just worried about the system, whether it can work, he's worried about American political leadership and what they think, or if they think, or if they know. And that was, you know, I was very receptive to understanding that because that's exactly what I went through, you know, 30 years earlier when I was at the Pentagon, looking at this dog of a missile defense.
And so, the Chinese look at this, they know the Americans are lying to them all the time. I could give you a good story about South Korea and the way we lied to the South Koreans and lied to the Chinese.
I was really furious with that. That was under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
And my view is...
And my view is if you're lying to an ally and you're lying, you know, I have very good friends. I'm very, very proud to say I have some very good friends who are high-level diplomats, and I've asked every one of them, would you lie in a negotiation? And every one of them has said, no. In other words, your credibility depends on your honesty.
You might not say something that, you know, could be relevant to a negotiation relevant to your adversary's thinking, but you would never lie because your credibility will, you'll never be believed again. That's their view of this.
And here we were under Hillary Clinton lying to an ally and lying to the Chinese, who I knew through my personal contacts, understood that we were lying to them. I know from personal contacts with the Chinese.
So, how do you expect people to treat you when they know you're a liar? To me, it's just simple human relations. And, and I now understand that because I have friends who are both diplomats and soldiers, and I know, if you have to lie to make a point there's something wrong and you're, you're jeopardizing your credibility with other professionals if, if you do that.
So, we should not be surprised that the Chinese are increasing their forces.
And when Putin marched out this horrifying Poseidon underwater torpedo, could potentially carry a hundred megaton warhead. It's nuclear-powered. It can travel at some very high speed, 50, 60 knots or more, and then it can go quiet, sneak into a Harbor, know coastal Harbor and detonate underwater, and destroy out to 30 or 40 kilometers, a complete area, urban area. And he has this weapon. He made it obvious that he had it. He showed plans for it.
Ted Postol: Well, what he was doing is he was saying to an American president who knows nothing. All right, assuming that the president knows nothing, that your missile defenses will not do anything about this weapon. That's what he did it for. He was an insurance policy toward bad decision-making by American political leadership. That's why he built that weapon. That's why he ordered that weapon built.
So not because, I mean, he may be a monster. That's another issue, but it's not because he was a monster, it's because he made a strategic calculation that that kind of weapon would cause any person, even if they were totally without knowledge and thought of how missile defense could work, to understand that you will not escape retribution if you attack Russia. That's why that weapon was built.
Physicist, startup founder, and polymath Steve Hsu discusses the end of the unipolar moment, the return of geopolitics, and the U.S.-China New Cold War. He believes China is not as fragile as some say. We talk Taiwan, how Beijing has caught up in military tech, and how the nature of naval warfare in the next war will be very different. On the technology and AI front, he feels the U.S. and China are at parity, but that the long-term trend is in China's favor. He feels the social credit system is advancing just as fast in the West as in China and that the digital yuan is rapidly gaining in stature. He gives his view on the Ukraine crisis and how it has been a huge strategic error by the U.S. because it has cemented the Eurasian alliance. He's concerned about a systemic financial meltdown, discusses being a victim of woke cancel culture, and knowing Richard Feynman.
Below is the closest thing I could find on YouTube -- it has better audio and video quality than the CERN talk.
The amazing story of Bruno Pontecorvo involves topics such as the first nuclear reactions and reactors (work with Enrico Fermi), the Manhattan Project, neutrino flavors and oscillations, supernovae, atomic espionage, the KGB, Kim Philby, and the quote:
I want to be remembered as a great physicist, not as your fucking spy!
The situation today is radically different from when Qian first returned to China. In a decade or two China may have ~10x as many highly able scientists and engineers as the US, comparable to the entire world (ex-China) combined [1]. Already the depth of human capital in PRC is apparent to anyone closely watching their rate of progress (first derivative) in space (Mars/lunar lander, space station, LEO), advanced weapons systems (stealth jets, radar, missiles, jet engines), AI/ML, alternative energy, materials science, nuclear energy, fundamental and applied physics, consumer electronics, drones, advanced manufacturing, robotics, etc. etc. The development of a broad infrastructure base for advanced manufacturing and R&D also contributes to this progress, of course.
[1] It is trivial to obtain this ~10x estimate: PRC population is ~4x US population, a larger fraction of PRC students pursue STEM degrees, and a larger proportion of PRC students reach elite levels of math proficiency, e.g., PISA Level 6.
"It was the stupidest thing this country ever did," former Navy Secretary Dan Kimball later said, according to Aviation Week. "He was no more a Communist than I was, and we forced him to go."
...
Qian Xuesen, a former Caltech rocket scientist who helped establish the Jet Propulsion Laboratory before being deported in 1955 on suspicion of being a Communist and who became known as the father of China's space and missile programs, has died. He was 98.
...
Qian, a Chinese-born aeronautical engineer educated at Caltech and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was a protege of Caltech's eminent professor Theodore von Karman, who recognized him as an outstanding mathematician and "undisputed genius."
Below, a documentary on Qian and a movie-length biopic (English subtitles).
... The US/NATO command may be woofing just to get more ships and planes funded, but woofing can go badly wrong. The people you’re woofing at may think you really mean it. That’s what came very close to happening in the 1983 Able Archer NATO exercises. The woofing by Reagan and Thatcher in the leadup to those exercises was so convincing to the Soviet woof-ees that even the moribund USSR came close to responding in real—like nuclear—ways.
That’s how contingency plans, domestic political theatrics, and funding scams can feed into each other and lead to real wars.
Military forces develop contingency plans. That’s part of their job. Some of the plans to fight China are crazy, but some are just plausible enough to be worrying, because somebody might start thinking they could work.
... What you do with a place like Xinjiang, if you’re a CIA/DoD planner, is file it under “promote insurgency” — meaning “start as many small fires as possible,” rather than “invade and begin a conventional war.”
And in the meantime, you keep working on the real complaints of the Uyghur and other non-Han ethnic groups, so that if you do need to start a conventional war in the Formosa Straits, you can use the Uyghur as a diversion, a sacrifice, by getting them to rise up and be massacred. Since there’s a big Han-Chinese population in Xinjiang, as the map shows, you can hope to stir up the sort of massacre/counter-massacre whipsaw that leaves evil memories for centuries, leading to a permanent weakening of the Chinese state.
This is a nasty strategy, but it’s a standard imperial practice, low-cost — for the empire, not the local population, of course. It costs those people everything, but empires are not sentimental about such things.
... The Uyghur in Xinjiang would serve the same purpose as the Iraqi Kurds: “straw dogs destined for sacrifice.” If you want to get really cynical, consider that the reprisals they’d face from an enraged Chinese military would be even more useful to the US/NATO side than their doomed insurgency itself.
Atrocity propaganda is very important in 21st c warfare. At the moment, there’s no evidence of real, mass slaughter in Xinjiang, yet we’re already getting propaganda claims about it. Imagine what US/NATO could make out of the bloody aftermath of a doomed insurgency. Well, assuming that US/NATO survived a war with China, a pretty dicey assumption. More likely, CNN, BBC, and NYT would be the first to welcome our new overlords, Kent Brockman style. Those mainstream-media whores aren’t too bright but Lord, they’re agile.
... Xinjiang, by contrast, can easily be imagined as One Giant Concentration Camp. After all, our leading “expert” on the province has never been there, and neither have his readers.
... The era of naval war based on carrier groups is over. They know that, even if they won’t say it.
If there’s a real war with China, the carriers will wait it out in San Diego harbor. I don’t say Honolulu, because even that wouldn’t be safe enough.
I’m not denigrating the courage or dedication of the crews and officers of USN vessels. At any level below JCOS, most of them are believers. But their belief is increasingly besieged and difficult to sustain, like an Episcopalian at Easter. You just can’t think too long about how cheap and effective antiship missiles are and still be a believer in aircraft carriers. As platforms of gunboat diplomacy against weak powers, they’re OK.
... The thing is, and it’s weird you even have to say this: China is a big strong country coming out of an era of deep national humiliation and suffering, proud of its new prosperity. China’s success in lifting a desperately poor population into something like prosperity will likely be the biggest story from this era, when the canonical histories get distilled.
A nation hitting this stage is likely to include a lot of people, especially young men, who are itching to show what their country can do. Their patriotic eagerness is no doubt as gullible as most, but it’s real, and if you pay any attention in the online world, you can’t help seeing it.
People who mouth off about China never seem to imagine that anyone in China might hear, because as we are told over and over again, China-is-an-authoritarian-state. The implication is that nobody in China has any of the nationalistic fervor that we take for granted in our own Anglo states.
... Given the history of US/China relations, from the pogroms against Chinese immigrants to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, through the demonization of Chinese mainlanders in the Cold War (which I remember distinctly from elementary school scare movies), the endless attempts to start insurgencies in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Fujian, to the nonstop violence and abuse of Asians in America, you don’t need to find reasons for Chinese people to want a war.
The odd thing is that most of them don’t seem to. That’s a remarkable testimony to the discipline and good sense of the Chinese public…so far. And it’s also, if you’re thinking clearly, a good reason not to keep provoking China in such gross, pointless ways. A population with that level of discipline and unity, matched with zooming prosperity, technical expertise, and pride on emerging from a long nightmare, is not one to woof at.
Of course the plan in the Pentagon is not real war. The plan is to slow China down, trip it up, “wrong-foot it” as they say in the Commonwealth.
... So what will China do about Taiwan? China could take it right now, if it wanted to pay the price. Everyone knows that, though many fake-news sites have responded with childish, ridiculous gung-ho stories about how “Taiwan Could Win.”
But will China invade? No. Not right now anyway. It doesn’t need to. The Chinese elite has its own constituencies, like all other polities (including “totalitarian” ones), and has to answer to them as circumstances change.
So far China has been extraordinarily patient, a lot more patient than we’d be if China was promising to fight to the death for, say, Long Island. But that can change. Because, as I never tire of repeating, the enemy of the moment has constituencies too. And has to answer to them.
So what happens if the US succeeds in hamstringing China’s economy? Welp, what’s the most reliable distraction a gov’t can find when it wants to unite a hard-pressed population against some distant enemy?
That’s when China might actually do something about Taiwan. ...
Note Added: Some readers may be alarmed that the War Nerd does not seem to accept the (Western) mass media propaganda about Xinjiang. Those readers might have poor memories, or are too young to know about, e.g., fake WMD or "babies taken out of incubators" or the countless other manufactured human rights abuses we read about in reliable journals like the New York Times or Washington Post.
Take these recent examples of US journalism on Afghanistan:
The fake drone strike that killed 10 innocent family members, one of our last acts as we abandoned Afghanistan. (Fake because we probably did it just to show we could "strike back" at the bad guys.) Non-Western media reported this as a catastrophic failure almost immediately. But very few people in the US knew it until the Pentagon issued an apology in a late Friday afternoon briefing just recently.
The drone strike was in retaliation for the suicide bombing at Kabul airport, in which (as reported by the Afghan government) ~200 people died. But evidence suggests that only a small fraction of these people were killed by bomb -- most of the 200 may have been shot by US and "coalition" (Turkish?) soldiers who might have panicked after the bombing. This is covered widely outside the US but not here.
If you want to understand the incredibly thin and suspicious sourcing of the "Uighur genocide" story, see here or just search for Adrian Zenz.
Just a few years ago there were plenty of Western travelers passing through Xinjiang, even by bicycle, vlogging and posting their videos on YouTube. I followed these YouTubers at the time because of my own travel interest in western and south-western China, not for any political reason.
If you watch just a few of these you'll get an entirely different impression of the situation on the ground than you would get from Western media. For more, see this comment thread:
I want to be clear that because PRC is an authoritarian state their reaction to the Islamic terror attacks in Xinjiang circa 2015 was probably heavy handed and I am sure some of the sad stories told about people being arrested, held without trial, etc. are true. But I am also sure that if you visit Xinjiang and ask (non-Han) taxi drivers, restaurant owners, etc. about the level of tension you will get a very different impression than what is conveyed by Western media.
...
No nation competing in geopolitics is without sin. One aspect of that sin (both in US and PRC): use of mass media propaganda to influence domestic public opinion.
If you want to be "reality based" you need to look at the strongest evidence from both sides.
...
Note to the credulous: The CIA venture fund InQTel was an investor in my first startup, which worked in crypto technology. We worked with CIA, VOA, NED ("National Endowment for Democracy" HA HA HA) on defeating the PRC firewall in the early internet era. I know a fair bit about how this all works -- NGO cutouts, fake journalists, policy grifters in DC, etc. etc. Civilians have no idea.
At the time I felt (and still sort of feel) that keeping the internet free and open is a noble cause. But do I know FOR SURE that state security works DIRECTLY with media and NGOs to distort the truth (i.e., lies to the American people, Iraq WMD yada yada). Yes, I know for sure and it's easy to detect the pattern just by doing a tiny bit of research on people like Cockerell or Zenz.
...
Keep in mind I'm not a "dove" -- MIC / intel services / deep state *has to* protect against worst case outcomes and assume the worst about other states.
They have to do nasty stuff. I'm not making moral judgements here.
But a *consequence* of this is that you have to be really careful about information sources in order to stay reality based...
Both panels below are, in my opinion, realistic and focused on the key issues. Good discussion of competition in military technology is, in my experience, difficult to find for various reasons. On the US side there are strong MIC vested interests (e.g., in preserving the carrier-centric Navy) that lead to self-censorship of difficult realities. Also, very few analysts have actual technical and military expertise -- they are more likely to be "policy entrepreneurs" without deep knowledge.
This is an excellent discussion of the US-China geopolitical situation with Professor Lanxin Xiang. Xiang was trained at SAIS (JHU PhD), and currently holds an academic position in Geneva while directing a research institute in Shanghai.
He has a uniquely deep understanding of both Western and Chinese perspectives on globalization, economic development, US-China competition.
Interestingly, he recently translated Skidelsky's biography of Keynes.
Two related articles in Asia Times by the Brazilian journalist Pepe Escobar:
Bonus: Bill Owens interview. See comments about Huawei at ~50m.
Wikipedia: William A. Owens (born May 8, 1940) is a retired admiral of the United States Navy and who served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996.[1][2] Since leaving the military in 1996, he served as an executive or as a member of the board of directors of various companies, including Nortel Networks Corporation.
... Already history has in a sense ceased to exist, i.e. there is no such thing as a history of our own times which could be universally accepted, and the exact sciences are endangered as soon as military necessity ceases to keep people up to the mark. Hitler can say that the Jews started the war, and if he survives that will become official history. He can’t say that two and two are five, because for the purposes of, say, ballistics they have to make four. But if the sort of world that I am afraid of arrives, a world of two or three great superstates which are unable to conquer one another, two and two could become five if the fuhrer wished it. That, so far as I can see, is the direction in which we are actually moving ...
... intellectuals are more totalitarian in outlook than the common people. On the whole the English intelligentsia have opposed Hitler, but only at the price of accepting Stalin. Most of them are perfectly ready for dictatorial methods, secret police, systematic falsification of history etc. so long as they feel that it is on ‘our’ side.
I am sure any reader can provide examples of the following from the "news" or academia or even from a national lab:
there is no such thing as a history of our own times which could be universally accepted
the exact sciences are endangered
two and two could become five
dictatorial methods ... systematic falsification of history etc. so long as they feel that it is on ‘our’ side.
Of course, there is nothing new under the sun. It takes only a generation for costly lessons to be entirely forgotten...
Wikipedia: Trofim Denisovich Lysenko ...Soviet agronomist and biologist. Lysenko was a strong proponent of soft inheritance and rejected Mendelian genetics in favor of pseudoscientific ideas termed Lysenkoism.[1][2]
In 1940, Lysenko became director of the Institute of Genetics within the USSR's Academy of Sciences, and he used his political influence and power to suppress dissenting opinions and discredit, marginalize, and imprison his critics, elevating his anti-Mendelian theories to state-sanctioned doctrine.
Soviet scientists who refused to renounce genetics were dismissed from their posts and left destitute. Hundreds if not thousands of others were imprisoned. Several were sentenced to death as enemies of the state, including the botanist Nikolai Vavilov. Scientific dissent from Lysenko's theories of environmentally acquired inheritance was formally outlawed in the Soviet Union in 1948. As a result of Lysenkoism and forced collectivization, 15-30 million Soviet and Chinese citizens starved to death in the Holodomor and the Great Chinese Famine.
...
In 1964, physicist Andrei Sakharov spoke out against Lysenko in the General Assembly of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: "He is responsible for the shameful backwardness of Soviet biology and of genetics in particular, for the dissemination of pseudo-scientific views, for adventurism, for the degradation of learning, and for the defamation, firing, arrest, even death, of many genuine scientists."
This is an interesting discussion of PRC Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), including the DF21, DF26, and DF17 systems. You can set the captions to English if necessary.
In response to US activity in the South China Sea and elsewhere, PRC recently conducted a test of DF21 and DF26 in the open ocean. Reportedly, a US "Cobra Ball" RC135S missile intelligence aircraft was present to monitor the activity.
The YouTube video discusses PRC ASBM capabilities, including
1. Infrared and radar final targeting
2. Maneuver capability
3. Capability of the missile to receive (ground based) over-the-horizon radar and satellite information while in flight.
These are the frequent subject of speculation in Western sources: "There is a long kill chain and we are not sure whether it is operational..." etc.
Assuming that PRC ASBM have these capabilities, which seems quite plausible to me, this test was presumably a demonstration for the US, to make sure that our military appreciates the PLARF ability to hit a moving target (e.g., US aircraft carrier) at sea. Once this mutual understanding is in place, FONOPs in the South China Sea become mere theatrics for the dim witted.
I always wondered who first worked out the theory of Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) produced by nuclear weapons. That an EMP would result from a nuclear explosion was known from the beginning:
During the first United States nuclear test on 16 July 1945, electronic equipment was shielded because Enrico Fermi expected the electromagnetic pulse. The official technical history for that first nuclear test states, "All signal lines were completely shielded, in many cases doubly shielded. In spite of this many records were lost because of spurious pickup at the time of the explosion that paralyzed the recording equipment."[2] During British nuclear testing in 1952–1953, instrumentation failures were attributed to "radioflash", which was their term for EMP.
But it's far from obvious that: prompt gamma rays from the nuclear explosion lead to Compton effect ionization, and the resulting Compton current interacts with the Earth's magnetic field to produce coherent synchrotron radiation forming a dangerous EM pulse.
During Cold War years in the 1950’s, a number of mysterious communication disruptions occurred. It was feared that the communications had been sabotaged in some way by the Soviet Union. Robert was at Caltech at the time, but was also a consultant for the Rand Corporation, and became aware of this phenomenon.
For years Robert had been outspoken in his opposition to atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and had put a good deal of effort into understanding the effects. At that time the U.S. was still performing atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. One test involved exploding an atomic bomb at a very high altitude, roughly 20 miles.
It had been known that atomic bombs could sometimes cause problems with electronics in the vicinity, but it was Robert who single-handedly worked out the physics by which atomic explosions in the upper atmosphere would produce an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could have catastrophic effects on circuits on the ground at very great distances, and could thereby disrupt communications. He was thus the first to connect the disruption of communications with the high- altitude nuclear explosions. He wrote this up as a classified report. It should be noted, however, that the warning in this report did not prevent the U.S. from carrying out the very-high-altitude “Starfish Prime” test of 1962. In this test a 1.4 megaton bomb was exploded over the Pacific Ocean at an altitude of 250 miles, causing electrical damage in Hawaii (about 900 miles away). The Soviets conducted similar high-altitude tests over Kazakhstan in the same year. These caused even more extensive damage since they were above an inhabited area rather than over the ocean.
The EMP effect of high-altitude atomic explosions is now widely known, but it was Robert Christy who first brought this phenomenon to the attention of the U.S. government. ...
[ See also articles by Longmire and Pfeffer. Perhaps the Soviets were ahead of Christy? Kompaneets, A. S., Radio Emission from an Atomic Explosion, Institute for Chemical Physics, Academy of Sciences, USSR, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics (USSR), English translation in volume 35, 1538-1544 (December 1958); Original article in Russian in JETP, 8, 1076-1080 (1954). ]
... the Los Alamos team discovered that the interface between the detonating explosives and the hollow sphere could become unstable and ruin the crushing power of the blast wave.
Dr. Christy, while studying implosion tests, realized that a solid core could be compressed far more uniformly, and he worked hard in the days that followed to convince his colleagues of its superiority. He succeeded, and the hollow core was replaced with one made of solid plutonium metal.
... Robert Frederick Christy was born May 14, 1916, in Vancouver and studied physics at the University of British Columbia. He was a graduate student at the University of California, Berkeley, under J. Robert Oppenheimer, a leading theoretical physicist who became known as the father of the atomic bomb.
After completing his studies in 1941, Dr. Christy worked at the University of Chicago before being recruited to join the Los Alamos team when Oppenheimer became its scientific director.
After the war, Dr. Christy joined Caltech in theoretical physics and stayed at the university for the rest of his academic career, serving as a faculty chairman, vice president, provost (from 1970 to 1980) and acting president (1977-78). He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences.
Ken Burns' Vietnam documentary is incredibly good. Possibly the best documentary I've ever seen. It's heartbreaking tragedy, with perspectives from all sides of the conflict: Americans and North and South Vietnamese, soldiers from both sides, war protestors, war planners, families of sons and daughters who died in the war.
I was a child when the war was winding down, so the America of the documentary is very familiar to me.
Here's the PBS web page from which you can stream all 18 hours. I have been watching the version that contains unedited explicit language and content (not broadcasted).
How did we get ICBMs? How did we get to the moon? What are systems engineering and systems management? Why do some large organizations make rapid progress, while others spin their wheels for decades at a time? Dominic Cummings addresses these questions in his latest essay.
... In 1953, a relatively lowly US military officer Bernie Schriever heard von Neumann sketch how by 1960 the United States would be able to build a hydrogen bomb weighing less than a ton and exploding with the force of a megaton, about 80 times more powerful than Hiroshima. Schriever made an appointment to see von Neumann at the IAS in Princeton on 8 May 1953. As he waited in reception, he saw Einstein potter past. He talked for hours with von Neumann who convinced him that the hydrogen bomb would be progressively shrunk until it could fit on a missile. Schriever told Gardner about the discussion and 12 days later Gardner went to Princeton and had the same conversation with von Neumann. Gardner fixed the bureaucracy and created the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee. He persuaded von Neumann to chair it and it became known as ‘the Teapot committee’ or ‘the von Neumann committee’. The newly formed Ramo-Wooldridge company, which became Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge (I’ll refer to it as TRW), was hired as the secretariat.
The Committee concluded (February 1954) that it would be possible to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 1960 and deploy enough to deter the Soviets by 1962, that there should be a major crash programme to develop them, and that there was an urgent need for a new type of agency with a different management approach to control the project. Although intelligence was thin and patchy, von Neumann confidently predicted on technical and political grounds that the Soviet Union would engage in the same race. It was discovered years later that the race had already been underway partly driven by successful KGB operations. Von Neumann’s work on computer-aided air defence systems also meant he was aware of the possibilities for the Soviets to build effective defences against US bombers.
‘The nature of the task for this new agency requires that over-all technical direction be in the hands of an unusually competent group of scientists and engineers capable of making systems analyses, supervising the research phases, and completely controlling experimental and hardware phases of the program… It is clear that the operation of this new group must be relieved of excessive detailed regulation by existing government agencies.’ (vN Committee, emphasis added.)
A new committee, the ICBM Scientific Advisory Committee, was created and chaired by von Neumann so that eminent scientists could remain involved. One of the driving military characters, General Schriever, realised that people like von Neumann were an extremely unusual asset. He said later that ‘I became really a disciple of the scientists… I felt strongly that the scientists had a broader view and had more capabilities.’ Schriever moved to California and started setting up the new operation but had to deal with huge amounts of internal politics as the bureaucracy naturally resisted new ideas. The Defense Secretary, Wilson, himself opposed making ICBMs a crash priority.
... Almost everybody hated the arrangement. Even the Secretary of the Air Force (Talbott) tried to overrule Schriever and Ramo. It displaced the normal ‘prime contractor’ system in which one company, often an established airplane manufacturer, would direct the whole programme. Established businesses were naturally hostile. Traditional airplane manufacturers were run very much on Taylor’s principles with rigid routines. TRW employed top engineers who would not be organised on Taylor’s principles. Ramo, also a virtuoso violinist, had learned at Caltech the value of a firm grounding in physics and an interdisciplinary approach in engineering. He and his partner Wooridge had developed their ideas on systems engineering before starting their own company. The approach was vindicated quickly when TRW showed how to make the proposed Atlas missile much smaller and simpler therefore cheaper and faster to develop.
... According to Johnson, almost all the proponents of systems engineering had connections with either Caltech (where von Karman taught and JPL was born) or MIT (which was involved with the Radiation Lab and other military projects during World War 2). Bell Labs, which did R&D for AT&T, was also a very influential centre of thinking. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) managed by Caltech also, under the pressure of repeated failure, independently developed systems management and configuration control. They became technical leaders in space vehicles. NASA, however, did not initially learn from JPL.
... Philip Morse, an MIT physicist who headed the Pentagon’s Weapons Systems Evaluation Group after the war, reflected on this resistance:
‘Administrators in general, even the high brass, have resigned themselves to letting the physical scientist putter around with odd ideas and carry out impractical experiments, as long as things experimented with are solutions or alloys or neutrons or cosmic rays. But when one or more start prying into the workings of his own smoothly running organization, asking him and others embarrassing questions not related to the problems he wants them to solve, then there’s hell to pay.’ (Morse, ‘Operations Research, What is It?’, Proceedings of the First Seminar in Operations Research, November 8–10, 1951.)
For decades, the American Right and Left argued about the degree to which the KGB infiltrated the U.S. political and scientific establishment. The Right said “A lot”; the Left said “Much less than you think.” Both sides did a lot of finger-pointing and, sadly, slandering. Things got very ugly. At the crux of the problem, though, was a lack of reliable information about exactly what the KGB had done and how successful (or not) they had been in recruiting Americans.
That changed in the mid-1990s. The United States de-classified the results of the “Venona Project,”–an intelligence initiative that involved the surveillance of secret Soviet cable traffic during World War Two–and Alexander Vassiliev, a Russian journalist, made his notebooks on KGB activities in the U.S. available to researchers. For the first time, scholars such as John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr could measure the success of KGB spying in the U.S. during the Cold War.
The results are eye-opening, as Haynes and Klehr explain in Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (Yale University Press, 2009). Though it’s probably unwise to speak of “winners and losers” in the debate over KGB spying in the U.S., Haynes and Klehr show that the Soviets, though often bungling, had done a pretty fair job of tapping sympathetic American Leftists and stealing American secrets. That said, they also discovered that some of those the Right had accused of spying (e.g., Robert Oppenheimer) were in fact innocent.
Caption: Left to right: Ludwig Prandtl (German scientist), Qian Xuesen, Theodore von Kármán. Prandtl served for Germany during the World War II; von Kármán and Qian served [for the] US Army; after 1956, Qian served for China. Notice that at that time Qian had US Army rank. Interestingly, Prandtl was doctoral advisor for von Kármán; von Kármán was doctoral advisor for Qian. (Picture and caption from this Wikipedia entry.)
"It was the stupidest thing this country ever did," former Navy Secretary Dan Kimball later said, according to Aviation Week. "He was no more a Communist than I was, and we forced him to go."
See also this biography by the late Iris Chang.
My father, also a professor of aerospace engineering, was an admirer of Qian and of von Karman. He was quite pleased that I decided to attend Caltech as an undergraduate -- although he would have preferred, for practical reasons, that I study EE or CS rather than theoretical physics!
Qian Xuesen dies at 98; rocket scientist helped establish Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Deported in 1955 on suspicion of being a Communist, the aeronautical engineer educated at Caltech became known as the father of China's space and missile programs.
November 1, 2009
Qian Xuesen, a former Caltech rocket scientist who helped establish the Jet Propulsion Laboratory before being deported in 1955 on suspicion of being a Communist and who became known as the father of China's space and missile programs, has died. He was 98.
Qian, also known as Tsien Hsue-shen, died Saturday in Beijing, China's state news agency reported. The cause was not given.
Honored in his homeland for his "eminent contributions to science," Qian was credited with leading China to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles, Silkworm anti-ship missiles, weather and reconnaissance satellites and to put a human in space in 2003.
The man deemed responsible for these technological feats also was labeled a spy in the 1999 Cox Report issued by Congress after an investigation into how classified information had been obtained by the Chinese.
Qian, a Chinese-born aeronautical engineer educated at Caltech and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was a protege of Caltech's eminent professor Theodore von Karman, who recognized him as an outstanding mathematician and "undisputed genius."
Qian's research contributed to the development of "jet-assisted takeoff" technology that the military began using in the 1940s.
He was the founding director of the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Jet Propulsion Center at Caltech and a member of the university's so-called Suicide Squad of rocket experimenters who laid the groundwork for testing done by JPL.
But his brilliant career in the United States came to a screeching halt in 1950, when the FBI accused him of being a member of a subversive organization. Qian packed up eight crates of belongings and set off for Shanghai, saying he and his wife and two young children wanted to visit his aging parents back home. Federal agents seized the containers, which they claimed contained classified materials, and arrested him on suspicion of subversive activity.
Qian denied any Communist leanings, rejected the accusation that he was trying to spirit away secret information and initially fought deportation. He later changed course, however, and sought to return to China.
Five years after his arrest, he was shipped off in an apparent exchange for 11 American airmen captured during the Korean War.
"I do not plan to come back," Qian told reporters. "I have no reason to come back. . . . I plan to do my best to help the Chinese people build up the nation to where they can live with dignity and happiness."
Welcomed as a national hero in China, where the Communist regime had defeated the Nationalist forces, Qian became director of China's rocket research and was named to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. China, whose scientific development lagged during the Communist revolution, quickly began making strides.
Qian was born in the eastern city of Hangzhou, and in 1934 graduated from Jiaotong University in Shanghai, where he studied mechanical engineering. He won a scholarship to MIT and, after earning a master's degree in aeronautical engineering there, continued his doctoral studies at Caltech.
He taught at MIT and Caltech and, having received a security clearance, served on the Scientific Advisory Board that advised the U.S. military during and after World War II.
Sent to Germany to interrogate Nazi scientists, Qian interviewed rocket scientist Wernher von Braun. As the trade magazine Aviation Week put it in 2007, upon naming Qian its person of the year, "No one then knew that the father of the future U.S. space program was being quizzed by the father of the future Chinese space program."
Qian returned to Caltech in 1949 and a year later faced the accusation by two former members of the Los Angeles Police Department's "Red Squad" that he was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party.
He admitted that while a graduate student in the 1930s he had been present at social gatherings organized by colleagues who also were accused of party membership, but he denied any political involvement.
Few can agree on the question of whether Qian was a spy. An examination of the papers Qian packed away failed to turn up any classified documents. Colleagues at Caltech firmly stood behind him, and he continued to do research there after he lost his security clearance. In fact, the university gave him its distinguished alumni award in 1979 in recognition of his pioneering work in rocket science.
Although federal officials started deportation procedures in 1950, he was prevented from leaving the country because it was decided that he knew too much about sensitive military matters that could be of use to an enemy.
For years, Qian was in a sort of limbo, being watched closely by the U.S. government and living under partial house arrest. Eventually he quit fighting his expulsion and actively worked to return to China. Some associates said that he was insulted because his loyalty to this country was questioned and that he initially wanted to clear his name.
Once he returned home in 1955, he threw himself into his research with what some saw as calculated revenge.
"It was the stupidest thing this country ever did," former Navy Secretary Dan Kimball later said, according to Aviation Week. "He was no more a Communist than I was, and we forced him to go."
I'm teaching about fission, fusion, nuclear power and bombs in class this week. I always search for the simplest way to organize and present complex material (students may disagree ;-). For this set of topics, I am struck by the elegance of the curve below.
It reminded me of The Curve of Binding Energy by New Yorker writer John McPhee, which I read many years ago. In it, he profiles Theodore Taylor, a leading bomb designer at Los Alamos who eventually became an anti-nuclear activist.
Theodore Brewster Taylor was born on July 11, 1925, in Mexico City. His grandparents had been missionaries, and his father was general secretary of the Y.M.C.A. in Mexico. A brilliant boy (he completed sixth grade the same year he started fourth), Ted was enthralled by his chemistry set, or, more precisely, its explosive possibilities.
"He enjoyed putting potassium chlorate and sulfur under Mexico City streetcars," Mr. McPhee wrote. "There was a flash, and a terrific bang."
Dr. Taylor received a bachelor's degree from the California Institute of Technology in 1945 and pursued a doctorate in physics at the University of California. But he failed his oral examinations - he lacked the capacity to focus on things that did not interest him - and he left the department in 1949. (He would eventually earn a Ph.D. from Cornell in 1954.)
He found a job at Los Alamos. "Within a week, I was deeply immersed in nuclear weaponry," Dr. Taylor wrote in a 1996 article in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. "I was fascinated by every bit of information I was given during those first few days."
Preternaturally inept at ordinary tasks (parking a car defeated him), he became an artist of the fission bomb, taking the massive nuclear weapons developed for the Manhattan Project and making them smaller and lighter without sacrificing explosive power. Over the next seven years, he designed a series of ever-smaller bombs, whose cunning names - Scorpion, Wasp, Bee, Hornet - captured both their size and their sting.
Dr. Taylor would develop the smallest fission bomb of its time, Davy Crockett, which weighed less than 50 pounds. (By contrast, Little Boy, dropped on Hiroshima, weighed almost 9,000 pounds.) At the other extreme, he designed Super Oralloy, which was at the time, Mr. McPhee wrote, "the largest-yield pure-fission bomb ever constructed in the world."
Viewed as a theoretical abstraction, Dr. Taylor's work had a cool, compelling elegance. Exploded in the Nevada desert, it made a satisfying flash and bang. The weapons, he often reminded himself, were meant to deter nuclear war, and if the United States did not develop them, the Soviets soon would.
In his 1996 article, he recalled how he spent Nov. 15, 1950, the day his daughter Katherine was born:
"Instead of being with my wife, Caro, I had spent the day at a military intelligence office, poring over aerial photographs of Moscow, placing the sharp point of a compass in Red Square and drawing circles corresponding to distances at which moderate and severe damage would result from the explosion at different heights of a 500-kiloton made-in-America bomb. I remember feeling disappointed because none of the circles included all of Moscow."
Presentation by Theodore B. Taylor, PhD, 20 April 1998, at Mickleton Monthly Meeting, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers)
...It's a long and dreary story, those twenty years or so of working on nuclear weapons. How that happened to take place after my writing home and saying I'm never going to work on these things was, I think, the kind of rationalization that anybody goes through when they are facing an addiction of some kind. That is, you have to make excuses for why you're doing this.
After some student activism at the University of California at Berkeley, in which three of us got very intense about calling for a general strike of all nuclear physicists worldwide, until the bombs were gone, we presented that to [J. Robert] Oppenheimer, who said, "Take it, burn it, forget you ever had anything to do with it, because you're going to be labeled as Communists the rest of your lives if you don't do what I say." Well, we didn't burn it, we didn't forget it, but we didn't pursue it.
Not long after that, I found myself very interested in the work I was doing, which at that time wasn't on bombs, it was high-energy physics at the University of California laboratory. In that situation, I did very well at the laboratory, but I did very poorly preparing for my oral exams on various subjects. I wasn't interested in those subjects. To make a somewhat long story short, I flunked out of graduate school. Although I was reinstated later if I wanted to, my boss at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, Robert Serber, calmed me down. He was very happy with some work I had been doing for him and with other theoretical physicists, and he said, "Don't worry; I'll get you a job at Los Alamos." And so, he called a person who, slightly later, became my boss, Carson Mark, and said, "There's this fellow, here, who's very good at what he's interested and very bad at what he's not interested in. Why don't you hire him? I'll bet he'll do something very helpful to the laboratory."
So Caro - my wife - and I and a four-month-old baby arrived at Los Alamos, November 1949. I suddenly just got so high within a week on what I was doing - finding out there were some real secrets about how these things work, things I had never imagined - but more important to me, as it turned out later, was there were a lot of things not yet followed through. My job was to look for extremes, things that people hadn't really tried before, to answer the question, can you make a bomb that can be fired out of a cannon, can you make a bomb that can be fired out of something more like a rifle, how big can you make a bomb, can you make a bomb that would destroy all of Moscow - which the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima would not do, by a long shot. So I got caught up in extremes. That went on for almost 20 years, not all of it at Los Alamos. I then changed jobs, because I wanted to try my hand at designing nuclear power systems, for peaceful purposes. ...
In reading about Taylor, I couldn't help but notice strange parallels with the life of another cold war Theodore -- Ted Kaczynski, the unabomber.
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Caption: Left to right: Ludwig Prandtl (German scientist), Qian Xuesen, Theodore von Kármán. Prandtl served for Germany during the World War II; von Kármán and Qian served [for the] US Army; after 1956, Qian served for China. Notice that at that time Qian had US Army rank. Interestingly, Prandtl was doctoral advisor for von Kármán; von Kármán was doctoral advisor for Qian. (Picture and caption from this Wikipedia 