Vineer Bhansali: Physics, Tail Risk Hedging, and 900% Coronavirus Returns - Manifold Episode #43

Steve and Corey talk with theoretical physicist turned hedge fund investor Vineer Bhansali. Bhansali describes his transition from physics to finance, his firm LongTail Alpha, and his recent outsize returns from the coronavirus financial crisis. Also discussed: derivatives pricing, random walks, helicopter money, and Modern Monetary Theory.

Transcript

LongTail Alpha

LongTail Alpha’s OneTail Hedgehog Fund II had 929% Return (Bloomberg)

A New Anomaly Matching Condition? (1992)
https://arxiv.org/abs/hep-ph/9211299

Added: Background on derivatives history here. AFAIK high energy physicist M.F.M. Osborne was the first to suggest the log-normal random walk model for securities prices, in the 1950s. Bachelier suggested an additive model which does not even make logical sense. See my articles in Physics World: 1 , 2


man·i·fold /ˈmanəˌfōld/ many and various.

In mathematics, a manifold is a topological space that locally resembles Euclidean space near each point.

Steve Hsu and Corey Washington have been friends for almost 30 years, and between them hold PhDs in Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Theoretical Physics. Join them for wide ranging and unfiltered conversations with leading writers, scientists, technologists, academics, entrepreneurs, investors, and more.

Steve Hsu is VP for Research and Professor of Theoretical Physics at Michigan State University. He is also a researcher in computational genomics and founder of several Silicon Valley startups, ranging from information security to biotech. Educated at Caltech and Berkeley, he was a Harvard Junior Fellow and held faculty positions at Yale and the University of Oregon before joining MSU.

Corey Washington is Director of Analytics in the Office of Research and Innovation at Michigan State University. He was educated at Amherst College and MIT before receiving a PhD in Philosophy from Stanford and a PhD in a Neuroscience from Columbia. He held faculty positions at the University Washington and the University of Maryland. Prior to MSU, Corey worked as a biotech consultant and is founder of a medical diagnostics startup.

Fischer Black: "a vision of the future that came true"

This is Barnard professor Perry Mehrling on the origin of interest rate and credit derivatives in the mind of Fischer Black. I highly recommend Mehrling's biography of Black, which I discussed previously here:

Black was both an undergrad and grad student at Harvard in physics. He didn't really complete his PhD in physics, but sort of drifted into AI-related stuff(!) at MIT, under cover of math or applied math.

The bio says the only course he ever had trouble with was Schwinger's course on advanced quantum. The biographer suggests Black did poorly due to lack of interest, but I find that hard to believe given the subject matter, the lecturer, and the times ;-)

Black's point of view was clearly that of a physicist or applied mathematician. He really was a fascinating guy, and the biographer, an academic economist, can appreciate a lot of Black's thinking -- it's not an entirely superficial book despite being non-technical.

After reading the book, I don't feel so bad about questioning some of the fundamental assumptions made by academic economists. Black was asking some of the very same questions during his career.

From the book jacket:

... Although the options formula made him famous, it was only one of Black's numerous contributions to finance, including portfolio insurance, commodity futures pricing, bond swaps and interest rate futures, and global asset allocation models that have become standard in the world of finance. Amazingly, he did it all despite having no formal training in finance or economics, and despite spending the bulk of his career in business settings. Certainly the most notable non-academic theoretician of modern finance, Fischer Black was one of a kind...

For more on derivatives history, see Pricing the Future and The World is our Laboratory.

Financial Weaponry

Financial Weaponry, my review of George Szpiro's Pricing the Future: Physics, Finance and the 300-year Journey to the Black–Scholes Equation, is now available at the Physics World site.

I posted some excerpts earlier here.

Pricing the Future

My review of George Szpiro's Pricing the Future: Physics, Finance and the 300-year Journey to the Black–Scholes Equation is in this month's Physics World. I'll post a link to the review itself if and when they make an ungated version available. Until then you'll have to content yourself with the excerpts below (click for larger version). See related post with some notes I made for the review.

Financial Weaponry 

Almost every physicist or mathematician below a certain age knows a former colleague or classmate who now works in finance. Older scientists, however, can probably remember a time before such “quants” existed. What happened to create this new and lucrative profession over the course of a few decades? 

... Since the payoff depends on future events, any pricing model must include, at minimum, a probability distribution over future outcomes. But in fact the problem is more subtle, because the value of a given probability distribution of future payouts to a particular individual depends on that individual’s attitude towards risk. ... 

... but experts are violently divided on the more general societal utility of advances in derivatives theory and practice. The conventional view, taught in business schools and in economics departments, is that financial innovation enables economic dynamism and allows markets to allocate resources more efficiently. The opposing perspective, held by none other than billionaire investor Warren Buffett, is that derivatives are "financial weapons of mass destruction" -- speculative instruments in a complex global casino that carry more risk than benefit. When Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway, bought the reinsurance firm General Re in 1998, the latter had 23,000 derivative contracts. Buffett later explained his attitude towards these contracts to a US government panel: “I could have hired 15 of the smartest people, you know, math majors, PhDs. I could have given them carte blanche to devise any reporting system that would enable me to get my mind around what exposure that I had, and it wouldn’t have worked,” he said. “Can you imagine 23,000 contracts with 900 institutions all over the world, with probably 200 of them names I can’t pronounce?” Ultimately, Buffett decided to unwind the derivative deals, even though doing so incurred some $400 million in losses for Berkshire. 

The recent financial crises suggest that Buffett’s attitude may be the right one, and that the potential benefits of derivatives and other complex instruments come with dangerous systemic risks. At a recent meeting to address post-crisis financial reforms, the former chief of the US Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, commented: “I wish somebody would give me some shred of evidence linking financial innovation with a benefit to the economy.” In Pricing the Future, Szpiro gives us a colourful history of derivatives, but does little to address Volcker’s fundamental question.

Revenge of the muppets?

No. This guy will probably regret writing a bitter resignation op-ed.

NYTimes: ... It makes me ill how callously people talk about ripping their clients off. Over the last 12 months I have seen five different managing directors refer to their own clients as “muppets,” sometimes over internal e-mail. Even after the S.E.C., Fabulous Fab, Abacus, God’s work, Carl Levin, Vampire Squids? No humility? I mean, come on. Integrity? It is eroding. I don’t know of any illegal behavior, but will people push the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned with the client’s goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact.

It astounds me how little senior management gets a basic truth: If clients don’t trust you they will eventually stop doing business with you. It doesn’t matter how smart you are.

These days, the most common question I get from junior analysts about derivatives is, “How much money did we make off the client?” It bothers me every time I hear it, because it is a clear reflection of what they are observing from their leaders about the way they should behave. Now project 10 years into the future: You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that the junior analyst sitting quietly in the corner of the room hearing about “muppets,” “ripping eyeballs out” and “getting paid” doesn’t exactly turn into a model citizen.

Already, the vampire squid is on the counterattack:

WSJ: ... Mr. Smith described himself as an executive director and head of Goldman’s U.S. equity derivatives business in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

A person familiar with the matter said Mr. Smith’s role is actually vice president, a relatively junior position held by thousands of Goldman employees around the world. And Mr. Smith is the only employee in the derivatives business that he heads, this person said.

More fun at the Times Dealbook blog:

Former Goldman trader, quit last year

This guy might as well have had a microphone in the room with me during my exit interview…took the words right out of my mouth. To add to one thing he said, I had never heard the term “rip someone’s face off” until I started working at Goldman Sachs. Unfortunately, that phrase was all too often used in the context of client transactions.

Matt Levine, former Goldman employee, now an editor at Dealbreaker:

Maybe if he’d gotten the Rhodes, or won a gold medal for regular tennis at the goyish Olympics, he’d have made MD and would still have a job.

Derivatives history

I'm writing a review (for Physics World) of a recent book on the history of options pricing, and I'm collecting a few links here so I don't lose them. Please ignore this post unless you are interested in arcana ... the actual review will appear here eventually.

AFAIK, high energy physicist M.F.M. Osborne was the first to note log-normal behavior of stock prices. (Bachelier, who amazingly gets so much credit, proposed arithmetic Brownian motion, which neither fits the data nor makes logical sense.) Osborne's book is quite interesting as he explores market microstructure, market making, supply-demand (bid-ask) in detail, going far beyond the usual idealizations made by economists. I had a library copy out years ago but perhaps I should actually buy my own someday. Of course modern HFT types have gone far beyond Osborne's work in the 1950s.

Mathematician Ed Thorp (of Beat the Dealer fame) obtained the Black Scholes equation years before Black and Scholes, but kept it a secret in order to trade on it for his fund. He also first obtained the correct pricing for American options. That he was way beyond Black and Scholes intellectually seems pretty obvious to me. Thorp's web site.

I wish I could remember whether MacKenzie got all this right.

First regulated futures market involved trading of rice in 17th century Japan.

Debt ceiling catastrophe?

USA AAA?

While we're waiting to see whether treasuries lose their AAA rating, here's something more real time: CME now imposing several percent haircut on US securities used as collateral. Previously the haircut was zero. How does this compare to other AAA rated securities?

Politicians, you have been warned.

Buffet on derivatives

Transcript of Buffet's recent interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

NYTimes: ... “If I look at JPMorgan, I see two trillion in receivables, two trillion in payables, a trillion and seven netted off on each side and $300 billion remaining, maybe $200 billion collateralized,” he said, walking through his thinking. “That’s all fine. But I don’t know what discontinuities are going to do to those numbers overnight if there’s a major nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist action that really is disruptive to the whole financial system.”

“Who the hell knows what happens to those numbers?” he asked. “I think it’s virtually unmanageable.”

Mr. Buffett defended Berkshire Hathaway’s use of derivatives, arguing that the company maintains a limited amount. At the time of the interview, the company had only about 250 derivative contracts. (It’s now down to 203.) “I want to know every contract, and I can do that with the way we’ve done it. But I can’t do it with 23,000 that a bunch of traders are putting on.”

... when Berkshire bought General Re in 1998, the reinsurance company had 23,000 derivative contracts. “I could have hired 15 of the smartest people, you know, math majors, Ph.D.’s. I could have given them carte blanche to devise any reporting system that would enable me to get my mind around what exposure that I had, and it wouldn’t have worked,” he said to the government panel. “Can you imagine 23,000 contracts with 900 institutions all over the world with probably 200 of them names I can’t pronounce?” Berkshire decided to unwind the derivative deals, incurring some $400 million in losses.

... Perhaps the most insightful nugget in the interview was Mr. Buffett’s explanation of why corporations use derivatives — and why they probably shouldn’t.

Many companies, as diverse as Coca-Cola and Burlington Northern, argue that they employ derivatives to hedge their risk. The United States-based Coca-Cola tries to protect against fluctuations in currencies since it does business around the world. Burlington Northern, the railroad giant, uses the investments to limit the impact of fuel prices.

Mr. Buffett, who has interests in both companies, claimed there was another agenda. “The reason many of them do it is that they want to smooth earnings,” he said, referring to the idea of trying to make quarterly numbers less volatile. “And I’m not saying there’s anything wrong with that, but that is the motivation.”

The numbers all even out eventually, he cautioned, so derivatives don’t really make much difference in the long term.

“They’re going to lose as much on the diesel fuel contracts over time as they make,” he said of Burlington Northern. “I wouldn’t do it.”

My very first post (2004) on this blog was about Fannie Mae's use of derivatives accounting to smooth earnings.

Germans on Greeks: "They had their fun"

See this summary of the Greek debt / eurozone crisis in the NYTimes.

Can anyone analyze the implied probabilities for different scenarios based on credit derivative prices? This is down to national politics now -- if the Germans can't stomach a Greek bailout, what's going to happen with the other PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain)? Default insurance on some of those countries must be going through the roof.

Here are eurozone credit spreads over time (WSJ). Looks like Ireland is next, then Italy and Spain. What is Soros up to? :-)

Janet Tavakoli interview

This was recommended by a commenter on my previous post. It's definitely worth watching if you have an interest in the financial crisis.



Here's a recommendation for her book:

"[T]he book’s real strength is the sub-plot that emerges as Tavakoli tugs vigorously at the seemingly disparate threads of the current financial crisis, naming names, citing cases and leaving no schmuck — whether investment bank, credit rating agency, monoline insurer, mortgage brokers, regulators and their ilk — unspared. Based on more than 20 years in the derivatives arena, and having served time at Salomon Bros, Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs, she knows that of what and who she speaks. Should anyone ever display the slightest interest in criminalizing the criminals who led us down this path, a prosecutor could do worse than ordering up copies for the grand jury."

Here's a nice figure from her web site:

Vive les Grandes Ecoles (AIG-Goldman edition)

Did negotiators from French banks save Goldman from a haircut on its AIG CDS contracts? Or did Goldman save the French banks with its, um, connections to Paulson and other high places?

WSJ: The Federal Reserve's decision to pay billions of dollars to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and other big banks as part of its bailout of American International Group Inc. has spawned criticism and conspiracy theories. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who presided over the New York Fed at the time, was summoned to Congress to explain why AIG paid off the $62.1 billion in soured derivatives in full, far more than they were worth in the market.

One element of the decision hasn't been well explored—how the Fed agreed to the full-payment demands of France's bank regulator and two of AIG's largest creditors, Société Générale SA and Calyon Securities, a unit of Crédit Agricole SA. The French banks and their regulator, it now appears, masterfully outmaneuvered the Americans to avoid discounts, or "haircuts," on their securities.

The French won the day by using a legal argument that some leading French scholars and corporate attorneys variously described in interviews as highly dubious and lacking real legal ground.

The banks and the regulator, known as the Commission Bancaire, said bank executives could be criminally liable for accepting a discount on their contracts, according to a November report of the inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

While true in the abstract, "their argument was very overstated," said Pierre-Henri Conac, a University of Luxembourg law professor and a director of France's oldest corporate-law review. "Banks give haircuts every day."

French banks aren't always the best negotiators, Mr. Conac added, but this time "the French were very good."

...

The Fed and AIG finally seized on a plan, according to the inspector general's report. Step one: Let the banks keep $35 billion of collateral already posted by AIG. Two: Purchase the banks' underlying securities, which were derivatives tied to low-grade mortgages. Three: Cancel the contracts. Over one frenzied weekend in early November, Fed and AIG officials struggled with the final step: What should they pay for those securities? By contract, the banks were guaranteed full payment.

There were some factors to suggest a lower, negotiated price was in order. The securities' market value had fallen significantly. And absent the extraordinary U.S. bailout, AIG would have been in bankruptcy, potentially leaving counterparties with zero.

...

"To say that these people would have gone to jail if they cut a deal and signed the same agreement as Goldman Sachs is really pushing beyond what goes on in France," said Christopher Mesnooh, a partner at Paris's Fields Fisher Waterhouse who has authored a book on French corporate law.

"There is no clear-cut provision that would have prevented SocGen or Calyon" from negotiating a discount, said one of Paris' top lawyers, who asked not to be named because he works for the banks.

More information may shake loose as Congress continues its study of AIG. At the upcoming hearings, one can only hope the French role is carefully examined. There may well have been compelling reasons for making good on the $20.8 billion owed the French banks. But —as is now clear—not for the legal reason that the Fed and the French banks claim.

Related links: AIG bailout , Societe Generale , Les Moines-Soldats , Les Grandes Ecoles

Plight of the risk managers

I'd like to recommend this podcast interview with Riccardo Rebonato. Rebonato, the author of the prescient book Plight of the Fortune Tellers, written before the financial crisis, is a former physicist turned quant.

Rebonato does not mince words, pointing out the weaknesses of mathematical models, and noting that most quants, although mathematically sophisticated, often lacked deep knowledge about markets and banking (I assume he does not include himself in this group). In my experience many quants never questioned the basic efficient market assumptions underlying their models, although some certainly did -- in particular, those with trading experience.

Rebonato is polite, even urbane, but disagrees with Econtalk interviewer Russ Roberts on many important issues. The most important question, which Rebonato addresses immediately, is whether enlightened, self-interested managers of financial institutions can be relied on to properly manage risk. Regulators accepted, on faith, the self-regulating abilities and properties of a system managed by such people. Thus, one of the main ingredients in the crisis was the ideological (as opposed to political or financial) capture of regulators by efficient market proponents.

Other interesting topics covered are the divergent risk tolerances and interests of bond holders vs equity holders vs regulators of banks [1], and whether moral hazard (anticipation of a bailout) played a role in the crisis -- Russ, the anti-government libertarian, says yes. Rebonato says no, the story only makes sense if told at the institutional level, whereas individual incentives were different. I think Rebonato's logic is impeccable. It's more persuasive to me that incentive schemes which allowed huge compensation based on short term (ultimately illusory) gains were much more of a factor. (See Clawbacks, fake alpha and tail risk.)

Dr. Riccardo Rebonato

Riccardo is Global Head of Market Risk and Global Head of Quantitative Research and Quantitative Analysis for Royal Bank of Scotland based in London. Prior to joining the Royal Bank of Scotland, he was Head of Complex Derivatives Trading Europe desk and Head of Derivatives Research at Barclays Capital, where he worked for nine years.

Riccardo is a Visiting Lecturer at Oxford University in Mathematical Finance and Adjunct Professor at the Tanaka Business School, Imperial College, London.

Before joining the financial world, Riccardo was a Research Fellow in Physics at Oxford University (Corpus Christi College) and, before that, Visiting Scientist at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Riccardo is the author of the books Plight of the Fortune Tellers ('07), The Perfect Hedger and the Fox (Wiley ’04), Modern Pricing of Interest-Rate Derivatives (Princeton University Press ’02), Interest-Rate Option Models (Wiley ’96,’98), Volatility and Correlation in Option Pricing (Wiley ’99). He has published several papers on finance (option modelling, computational techniques, risk management) in academic journals. He is a regular speaker at conferences worldwide.

[1] Footnote: see my earlier post on the vacuous Modigliani-Miller theorem. I recently learned from Vernon Smith's memoir (see pages 230-231 and 276) that he has similar opinions. Google books link; also search under "MM".

Gillian Tett at LSE

Highly recommended: FT journalist Gillian Tett, a PhD in social anthropology, discusses her book on the financial crisis: Fool's Gold, at an LSE public lecture.

I haven't read the book yet, but it's on my list :-) Here are two nice excerpts that appeared in the FT. She does a great job of covering the birth and development of credit derivatives, CDOs, etc.

Genesis of the debt crisis

How panic gripped the world's biggest banks

Below is a discussion of correlation from the first excerpt.

The problem with correlation

Demchak was acutely aware that modelling the risks involved in credit derivatives deals had its limits. One of the trickiest problems revolved around the issue of “correlation”, or the degree to which defaults in any given pool of loans might be interconnected. Trying to predict correlation is a little like working out how many apples in a bag might go rotten. If you watch what happens to hundreds of different disconnected apples over several weeks, you might guess the chance that one apple might go rotten – or not. But what if they are sitting in a bag together? If one apple goes mouldy, will that make the others rot too? If so, how many and how fast?

Similar doubts dogged the corporate world. JP Morgan statisticians knew that company debt defaults are connected. If a car company goes into default, its suppliers may go bust, too. Conversely, if a big retailer collapses, other retail groups may benefit. Correlations could go both ways, and working out how they might develop among any basket of companies is fiendishly complex. So what the statisticians did, essentially, was to study past correlations in corporate default and equity prices and program their models to assume the same pattern in the present. This assumption wasn’t deemed particularly risky, as corporate defaults were rare, at least in the pool of companies that JP Morgan was dealing with. When Moody’s had done its own modelling of the basket of companies in the first Bistro deal, for example, it had predicted that just 0.82 per cent of the companies would default each year. If those defaults were uncorrelated, or just slightly correlated, then the chance of defaults occurring on 10 per cent of the pool – the amount that might eat up the $700m of capital raised to cover losses – was tiny. That was why JP Morgan could declare super-senior risk so safe, and why Moody’s had rated so many of these securities triple-A.

The fact was, however, that the assumption about correlation was just that: guesswork. And Demchak and his colleagues knew perfectly well that if the correlation rate ever turned out to be appreciably higher than the statisticians had assumed, serious losses might result. What if a situation transpired in which, when a few companies defaulted, numerous others followed? The number of defaults required to set off such a chain reaction was a vexing unknown. Demchak had never seen it happen, and the odds seemed extremely long, but even if there was just a minute chance of such a scenario, he didn’t want to find himself sitting on $100bn of assets that could conceivably go bust. So he decided to play it safe, and told his team to look for ways to cut their super-senior liabilities again, irrespective of what the regulators were saying.

That stance cost JP Morgan a fair amount of money, because it had to pay AIG and others to insure the super-senior risk, and those fees rose steadily as the decade wore on. In the first such deals with AIG, the fee had been just 0.02 cents for every dollar of risk insured each year. By 1999, the price was nearer 0.11 cents per dollar. But Demchak was determined that the team must be prudent.

Merton on the financial crisis

This talk is long but very good. If you are impatient you can skip to the last 3 minutes where Merton answers a question about the CDS market that has been widely discussed. He points out the value for real world companies of being able to transfer credit risk as opposed to the narrower application of insuring a bond that they actually own.

The central point of the first part of the talk -- the embedded put option in a plain vanilla loan, and associated nonlinearities -- is nice but I don't think it is as essential to the current crisis as he suggests. (It's obviously in his interests to downplay the complexity of new financial instruments relative to traditional ones. The difference, of course, is that we've had much more time to get used to the traditional ones and build the proper safeguards and regulatory systems.) Merton is refreshingly modest about his understanding of the complex causes of the crisis. At one point he notes that the post mortem investigation into the crisis is unlikely to produce a Feynman moment, in which someone holds up an O-ring that caused the disaster!

Here is another link in case the player below doesn't work for you.





I sat in on Merton's graduate class on options pricing theory at Harvard in the early 1990s. I still have the lecture notes and a black paperback copy of Continuous Time Finance. He seemed much more confident at the time, but of course that was before LTCM :-)

I was one of the first people to recast options pricing theory into the language of Feynman path integrals. (You don't need the power of quantum field theory for this; the log of the price of the underlying security is just the position of a particle in simple 1D quantum mechanics in imaginary time -- i.e., it's just Brownian motion.) A friend of mine had been assigned a thesis project by Andy Lo at MIT, to price a certain type of exotic, path dependent option sold by Citibank. Lo didn't know the option could be priced in closed form (neither did Citi, it turns out); he asked my friend to do it numerically by brute force Monte Carlo. Using path integrals I found an exact expression for my friend, which agreed perfectly with his simulations.

AIG killed by CDS collateral calls

As I suspected, AIG's CDS collateral obligations have eaten up the government's initial $85 billion loan commitment, which was recently boosted to $123 billion. AIG's CEO reported that they had sold over $400 billion in CDS contracts.

The WSJ piece below profiles Yale finance professor Gary Gorton, who helped Cassano's group (AIG Financial Products) build their risk models. They note that there is still a chance that the models are ok -- that in the long run losses on the securities they insured may not be large. The problem is that the CDS contracts require the insurer to post additional collateral if the market value of the security in question falls. Since all credit related products are oversold due to rampant fear, this forces collateral calls even on good securities (if there are any). I can imagine that triggers might depend on the value of various CDS indices, which have plummeted during the crisis.

If -- and it's a big if -- AIG's actual CDS payouts are limited, the government and taxpayers stand to make a lot of money over the next 3-5 years. When markets return to normal the profitable ordinary insurance parts of AIG can be liquidated to pay off the bridge loan. In that scenario the big losers are AIG shareholders -- the government, as the lender of last resort, will have bought a distressed AIG for a song. In the bad scenario we will enter a long, harsh recession and AIG will end up paying out on much of its $400 billion in obligations, perhaps exceeding even the long term liquidation value of the firm. In that case the US taxpayer will foot the bill.

WSJ: ...AIG itself has been forced to post about $50 billion in collateral to its trading partners, largely to offset sharp drops in the value of securities it insured with the credit-default swaps. These payments have continued to balloon after the bailout -- raising the specter that the government will eventually have to lend more taxpayer money to AIG.

...AIG's credit-default-swaps operation was run out of its AIG Financial Products Corp. unit, which had offices in London and Wilton, Conn. In essence, AIG sold insurance on billions of dollars of debt securities backed by everything from corporate loans to subprime mortgages to auto loans to credit-card receivables. It promised buyers of the swaps that if the debt securities defaulted, AIG would make good on them.

...The swaps expose AIG to three types of financial pain. If the debt securities default, AIG has to pay up. But there are two other financial risks as well. The buyers of the swaps -- AIG's "counterparties" or trading partners on the deals -- typically have the right to demand collateral from AIG if the securities being insured by the swaps decline in value, or if AIG's own corporate-debt rating is cut. In addition, AIG is obliged to account for the contracts on its own books based on their market values. If those values fall, AIG has to take write-downs.

...Mr. Gorton's models harnessed mounds of historical data to focus on the likelihood of default, and his work may indeed prove accurate on that front. But as AIG was aware, his models didn't attempt to measure the risk of future collateral calls or write-downs, which have devastated AIG's finances.

The problem for AIG is that it didn't apply effective models for valuing the swaps and for collateral risk until the second half of 2007, long after the swaps were sold, AIG documents and investor presentations indicate. The firm left itself exposed to potentially large collateral calls because it had agreed to insure so much debt without protecting itself adequately through hedging.

...Early on, Mr. Gorton billed AIG about $250 an hour, which likely would have netted him about $200,000 a year, says a former senior executive at the unit. Eventually, his pay was far greater; another former colleague estimates it at $1 million a year.

Mr. Gorton collected vast amounts of data and built models to forecast losses on pools of assets such as home loans and corporate bonds. Speaking to investors last December, Mr. Cassano credited Mr. Gorton with "developing the intuition" that he and another top executive had "relied on in a great deal of the modeling that we've done and the business that we've created."

...As the debt securities created by Wall Street became more complicated, so did the swaps AIG offered. Around 2004, it began selling swaps designed to provide insurance on securities called collateralized-debt obligations, or CDOs, that were backed by securities such as mortgage bonds. Merrill Lynch & Co., then a major seller of the CDOs, was a big client.

So-called multisector CDOs, in particular, were exceptionally complex, involving more than 100 securities, each backed by multiple mortgages, auto loans or credit-card receivables. Their performance depended on tens of thousands of disparate loans whose value was hard to determine and performance difficult to systematically predict. In assessing their risk, Mr. Gorton constructed worst-case scenarios that factored in the probability of defaults on the underlying securities.

In late 2005, senior executives at the unit grew worried about loosening lending standards in the subprime-mortgage market. AIG decided to stop selling credit protection on multisector CDOs, partly due to "concerns that the model was not going to be able to handle declining underwriting standards," Mr. Gorton told investors last December. But by the time it stopped, in early 2006, its exposure to multisector CDOs had ballooned to $80 billion.

Lehman CDS auction

Starts in a few minutes. Previous posts here, here and here.

The 350 participants in the auction -- meaning each of them are party to at least one CDS contract referencing (insuring) Lehman debt -- are a rogues gallery of big financial firms. Guess who has been trying to raise cash in anticipation of today, when hundreds of billions could change hands? The net payments will be much less than this notional amount, but each player has to have their cash ready -- the cancellations may be "non-local" (between multiple parties; see figure at bottom).

Bloomberg: ...Lehman's $128 billion of bonds were trading yesterday at an average of 13 cents on the dollar, indicating credit swap sellers may have to pay 87 cents.

...More than 350 banks and investors signed up to settle credit-default swaps tied to Lehman. No one knows exactly how much is at stake because there's no central exchange or system for reporting trades. It's that lack of transparency that has increased the reluctance of financial institutions to do business with each other, exacerbating the global credit crisis and prompting calls for regulation of the market.

The list of participants includes Newport Beach, California- based Pimco, manager of the world's largest bond fund, Chicago- based hedge fund manager Citadel Investment Group LLC, and American International Group Inc., the New York-based insurer taken over by the government, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association in New York.

...Hedge funds, insurance companies and banks typically buy and sell credit protection, which is used either to insure a bond against default or as a bet against the company's ability to pay its debt.

Settlement of Lehman contracts may lead to protection sellers paying out as much as $220 billion, assuming a 20 percent recovery on the U.S. bank's senior debt, according to Andrea Cicione, a London-based credit strategist at BNP Paribas SA. [Others estimate as high as $400B.]

``Banks can go to the Federal Reserve, or use the commercial paper market where it is still functioning'' to meet protection payments, said Cicione. ``But fund managers or hedge funds, once they've used their cash, have only one option, to sell assets.''

Web of three contracts with net value of $.1B and notional value of $3.1B. Even though, ultimately, only $.1B changes hands, each party may have had to bring $1B or more to the table. (Even if they have canceling positions, like B in the figure, there is always counterparty risk -- what if A can't pay up?)


Update: Priced out at 8.625 cents on the dollar (Bloomberg). Here's an example of the type of fund that has been selling into the markets to meet obligations.

A unit of Primus Guaranty Ltd., a Bermuda-based company that has sold more than $24 billion in credit-default swaps, said last month it guaranteed $80 million of Lehman debt. The firm sold protection on $215 million of Fannie and Freddie debt and $16.1 million on WaMu. Yesterday, it said it also had made bets of $68.2 million on Kaupthing Bank hf, which the Icelandic government seized. Primus said last week it had $820 million in cash and liquid investments to meet claims on the contracts.

Felix Salmon notes that today was just the auction and parties don't settle until October 21. A commenter there claims the contracts are collateralized daily. I don't know if that is true, but if it is then the auction doesn't do much except set the price, which we sort of knew beforehand from earlier trades.

Second update: I was told again that most CDS contracts require the party offering protection to post collateral, which adjusts according to the market value of the debt. That means that the auction itself is more an accounting event than an economic event. When the default occurs the insurers already have a rough idea of what they will owe and presumably start selling assets to cover their obligations. In this case (LEH) the auction price came out below but not that far from where the market was pricing the debt beforehand. Whether any CDS issuers won't be able to cover their obligations won't be known until October 21.

More on Lehman CDS auction

There's very little information on the web about this. Elizabeth McDonald at Fox Business:

...A key driver behind the market plunge has been the tremendous demand for cash from counterparties related to the CDS (credit default swap) payouts on these recent major credit events.

It’s all happening now.

This past Monday: An estimated $200 bn to more than $1 tn in CDS written on Fannie and Freddie’s debt, the two companies’ senior and subordinated debt, were auctioned on Monday.

Reports indicate that protection sellers on the mortgage giants’ subordinated debt won big time here, with contracts on Fannie Mae’s subordinated debt recovering 99.9% of the sum insured, and swaps on Freddie Mac’s subordinated debt recovering 98%, reports auction administrators Creditex and Markit.

However, CDSs on the senior debt got less, with Fannie Mae’s senior swaps recovering 91.5% the sum insured and Freddie Mac’s senior swaps recovering 94%. CDS sellers’ losses less than expected being felt here, because Fannie and Freddie debt have rallied since the two were placed under conservatorship;

This Friday, October 10th: When the Lehman deals get unwound. Potentially $400 bn in payouts. Lehman debt now trading between 15 cents and 19 cents on the dollar, with imputed losses of 81 cents and 85 cents on the dollar.

Felix Salmon has a nice discussion, and a news search brings up this schedule for the auction. My CDS posts here.

Salmon: ...Now there are people who made money betting against Lehman Brothers by buying default protection. And since the CDS market is a zero-sum game, there must therefore be people who lost money by selling that protection. The $400 billion question is whether they have the wherewithal to make good on their obligation. (And remember that $400 billion is a gross number: the net exposure -- the total amount that some people made and others lost -- is much smaller.)

I'm optimistic on that front: I think the answer is yes, although it might well involve selling collateral and other securities in order to come up with the cash. So there could be some nasty liquidation events on or around October 10. But I suspect that a lot of the exposure to Lehman came from synthetic bonds, CDOs of CDSs, and that kind of thing -- in other words, it resides on the buy-side, not on the sell-side.

It's always possible that some hedge fund somewhere will find itself going bust as a result of writing protection on Lehman -- but so far the big hedge-fund returns on CDS have been positive (Paulson, Lahde) and not negative. I'm holding out hope that the same will hold true on October 10.

This just up from Barry Ritholtz. Today (Thursday) looks like a very bad day for equities... suspicious. Tomorrow could be worse?

I've heard concerns from various traders and hedge fund managers over the past few weeks that the Lehamn Brothers (LEH) derivatives unwind has been what's roiling markets.

Early October, Citi (C) credit analyst Michael Hampden-Turner estimated there is $400bn of Lehman credit derivatives that will be settled on Friday.

This picture may tell all, once the dust settles. Either I am overly focused on the role of CDS, or the financial press and academic economists are totally missing one of the biggest drivers of systemic risk and current volatility. Here is a post I wrote in 2005 linking CDS strategies to equity vol. At the time, over half of all CDS volume involved hedge funds. In the end I think we're going to see some big hedge funds wiped out from selling naked or poorly hedged CDS insurance.

The subprime primer

In case you haven't seen this, it's pretty funny (strong language warning).

Special bonus: The Making of Goldman Sachs. Leonard Lopate interviews Charles Ellis, the author of The Partnership.

Double plus good: the Times goes after Greenspan and those weapons of mass destruction, derivatives.

Phil Gramm, McCain and the CDS meltdown

In my last post I tried to illustrate why certain entities like AIG might be too connected (not just too BIG) to fail. I didn't mean politically connected -- I meant too connected in the web of unregulated credit default swap contracts. So connected that if, for example, AIG were to fail, the entire financial system would collapse. The now $60 trillion CDS market is a tangle of unknown and unregulated contracts whose value depends sensitively on the behavior of underlying securities such as bundles of mortgages.

The "too connected to fail" problem could have been averted with some simple regulatory steps; ideally in the future we should have a central exchange for these contracts with collateral requirements. I've discussed the incredible growth of the CDS market several times on this blog. But I always wondered why it was't more carefully regulated.

Economist: (2006) OVER a year ago, a whiff of something nasty filled the nostrils of the world's financial regulators. It came, appropriately, from the back end of the credit-derivatives market, an unregulated asset class that was growing so fast that banks and hedge funds that dabbled in it had lost track of their trades.

In other markets where trading is private (rather than on an exchange), the problem might have seemed minor, involving thankless back-office tasks with monotonous names like matching and confirmation. But this time regulators saw a threat to the stability of banks, because of the popularity of credit-default swaps (CDSs), instruments that disperse lending risk around the financial system.

...Last month Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, startled bond traders at a dinner in New York with both a friendly pat and a slap on the wrist. Credit derivatives, he gushed, were “becoming the most important instruments I've seen in decades.” But he then went on to say how appalled he was at the “19th-century technology” used to trade credit-default swaps, with deals done over the phone and on scraps of paper.

The answer, apparently, is in a bill sponsored by McCain economic advisor Phil Gramm -- the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, passed in 2000, which exempts swaps from regulation! [Thanks to reader STS for making me aware of this.]

Did McCain know about this earlier in the week when, after first pretending there was no crisis in financial markets, he ranted about the betrayal of the noble American worker by the greed and corruption of Wall Street?

MotherJones: ...But Gramm's most cunning coup on behalf of his friends in the financial services industry—friends who gave him millions over his 24-year congressional career—came on December 15, 2000. It was an especially tense time in Washington. Only two days earlier, the Supreme Court had issued its decision on Bush v. Gore. President Bill Clinton and the Republican-controlled Congress were locked in a budget showdown. It was the perfect moment for a wily senator to game the system. As Congress and the White House were hurriedly hammering out a $384-billion omnibus spending bill, Gramm slipped in a 262-page measure called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. Written with the help of financial industry lobbyists and cosponsored by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the chairman of the agriculture committee, the measure had been considered dead—even by Gramm. Few lawmakers had either the opportunity or inclination to read the version of the bill Gramm inserted. "Nobody in either chamber had any knowledge of what was going on or what was in it," says a congressional aide familiar with the bill's history.

It's not exactly like Gramm hid his handiwork—far from it. The balding and bespectacled Texan strode onto the Senate floor to hail the act's inclusion into the must-pass budget package. But only an expert, or a lobbyist, could have followed what Gramm was saying. The act, he declared, would ensure that neither the SEC nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) got into the business of regulating newfangled financial products called swaps—and would thus "protect financial institutions from overregulation" and "position our financial services industries to be world leaders into the new century."

...But the Enron loophole was small potatoes compared to the devastation that unregulated swaps would unleash. Credit default swaps are essentially insurance policies covering the losses on securities in the event of a default. Financial institutions buy them to protect themselves if an investment they hold goes south. It's like bookies trading bets, with banks and hedge funds gambling on whether an investment (say, a pile of subprime mortgages bundled into a security) will succeed or fail. Because of the swap-related provisions of Gramm's bill—which were supported by Fed chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury secretary Larry Summers—a $62 trillion market (nearly four times the size of the entire US stock market) remained utterly unregulated, meaning no one made sure the banks and hedge funds had the assets to cover the losses they guaranteed.

In essence, Wall Street's biggest players (which, thanks to Gramm's earlier banking deregulation efforts, now incorporated everything from your checking account to your pension fund) ran a secret casino.

Notional vs net: complexity is our enemy

The credit default swap (CDS) market, where AIG played, had notional outstanding value of about $45 trillion at the end of 2007 (about $60 trillion now). Of course many of these contracts are partially canceling, so the net value of contracts in the market is much smaller than the notional value. Unfortunately, the network diagram (network of contracts) probably looks something like this: Imagine removing -- due to insolvency, lack of counterparty confidence, lack of shareholder confidence, etc. -- one of the nodes in the middle of the graph with lots of connections. What does that do to the detailed cancellations that reduce the notional value of $45 trillion to something more manageable? Suddenly, perfectly healthy nodes in the system have uncanceled liabilities or unhedged positions to deal with, and the net value of contracts skyrockets. This is why some entities are too connected to fail, as opposed to too BIG to fail. Systemic risk is all about complexity. Here's a simple example of a network of contracts whose notional value is much larger than its net value. Suppose A = AIG, B = Barclays and C = Citigroup have traded CDS contracts related to a particular pool of mortgages. If defaults in the pool exceed some threshold, A must pay B $1 billion, but will receive $1.1 billion from C. Now suppose there is a third contract in which B pays $1 billion to C if defaults exceed the threshold. The notional value of all contracts is $3.1 billion, but the net value that changes hands is only $.1 billion. So notional value is 31 times net. B's position is completely neutral and A and C only have $.1 billion at risk. This may sound contrived, but it's actually not unrealistic. Everything is fine until, say, A has a problem. Suppose A becomes insolvent and *poof* disappears. B and C are left with naked $1 billion bets on mortgages. Suddenly the notional value, which wasn't previously very representative of the amount at risk, due to the cancellations, isn't far off from the amount at risk ($3.1 vs 1 billion). Now scale this little example up to, say, $45 trillion in notional value, thousands of bets and dozens of firms, and you've got systemic risk!