The Balance of Power in the Western Pacific and the Death of the Naval Surface Ship

Recent satellite photos suggest that PLARF (People's Liberation Army Rocket Forces) have been testing against realistic moving ship targets in the deserts of the northwest. Note the ship model is on rails in the second photo below. Apparently there are over 30km of rail lines, allowing the simulation of evasive maneuvers by an aircraft carrier (third figure below).

Large surface ships such as aircraft carriers are easy to detect (e.g., satellite imaging via radar sensors), and missiles (especially those with maneuver capability) are very difficult to stop. Advances in AI / machine learning tend to favor missile targeting, not defense of carriers. 

The key capability is autonomous final target acquisition by the missile at a range of tens of km -- i.e., the distance the ship can move during missile flight time after launch. State of the art air to air missiles already do this in BVR (Beyond Visual Range) combat. Note, they are much smaller than anti-ship missiles, with presumably much smaller radar seekers, yet are pursuing a smaller, faster, more maneuverable target (enemy aircraft). 

It seems highly likely that the technical problem of autonomous targeting of a large surface ship during final missile approach has already been solved some time ago by the PLARF. 

With this capability in place one only has to localize the carrier to within few x 10km for initial launch, letting the smart final targeting do the rest. The initial targeting location can be obtained through many methods, including aircraft/drone probes, targeting overflight by another kind of missile, LEO micro-satellites, etc. Obviously if the satellite retains coverage of the ship during the entire attack, and can communicate with the missile, even this smart final targeting is not required.

This is what a ship looks like to Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) from Low Earth Orbit (LEO).  PRC has had a sophisticated system (Yaogan) in place for almost a decade, and continues to launch new satellites for this purpose.

See LEO SAR, hypersonics, and the death of the naval surface ship:

In an earlier post we described how sea blockade (e.g., against Japan or Taiwan) can be implemented using satellite imaging and missiles, drones, AI/ML. Blue water naval dominance is not required. 

PLAN/PLARF can track every container ship and oil tanker as they approach Kaohsiung or Nagoya. All are in missile range -- sitting ducks. Naval convoys will be just as vulnerable. 

Sink one tanker or cargo ship, or just issue a strong warning, and no shipping company in the world will be stupid enough to try to run the blockade. 

But, But, But, !?! ...

USN guy: We'll just hide the carrier from the satellite and missile seekers using, you know, countermeasures! [Aside: don't cut my carrier budget!] 

USAF guy: Uh, the much smaller AESA/IR seeker on their AAM can easily detect an aircraft from much longer ranges. How will you hide a huge ship? 

USN guy: We'll just shoot down the maneuvering hypersonic missile using, you know, methods. [Aside: don't cut my carrier budget!] 

Missile defense guy: Can you explain to us how to do that? If the incoming missile maneuvers we have to adapt the interceptor trajectory (in real time) to where we project the missile to be after some delay. But we can't know its trajectory ahead of time, unlike for a ballistic (non-maneuvering) warhead.

More photos and maps in this 2017 post.

LEO SAR, hypersonics, and the death of the naval surface ship

 

Duh... Let's spend ~$10B each for new aircraft carriers that can be easily monitored from space and attacked using hypersonic missiles. 

Sure, in a real war with a peer competitor we'll have to hide them far from the conflict zone. But they're great for intimidating small countries...

More on aircraft carriers.

The technology described in the videos is LEO SAR = Low Earth Orbit Synthetic Aperture Radar. For some people it takes vivid imagery to convey rather basic ideas.

In an earlier post we described how sea blockade (e.g., against Japan or Taiwan) can be implemented using satellite imaging and missiles, drones, AI/ML. Blue water naval dominance is not required. PLAN/PLARF can track every container ship and oil tanker as they approach Kaohsiung or Nagoya. All are in missile range -- sitting ducks. Naval convoys will be just as vulnerable. 

Sink one tanker or cargo ship, or just issue a strong warning, and no shipping company in the world will be stupid enough to try to run the blockade. With imaging accuracy of ~1m, missile accuracy will be similar to that of precision guided munitions using GPS.

 

Excerpt below from China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites and the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile – An Update, International Strategic and Security Studies Programme (ISSSP), National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS -- India), December 2013. With present technology it is easy to launch LEO (Low Earth Orbit) micro-satellites on short notice to track ships, but PRC has had a sophisticated system in place for almost a decade.

Authors: Professor S. Chandrashekar and Professor Soma Perumal 

We can state with confidence that the Yaogan satellite constellation and its associated ASBM system provide visible proof of Chinese intentions and capabilities to keep ACG strike groups well away from the Chinese mainland. 

Though the immediate purpose of the system is to deter the entry of a hostile aircraft carrier fleet into waters that directly threatens its security interests especially during a possible conflict over Taiwan, the same approach can be adopted to deter entry into other areas of strategic interest. 

Viewed from this perspective the Chinese do seem to have in place an operational capability for denying or deterring access into areas which it sees as crucial for preserving its sovereignty and security.

ICEYE, a Finnish micro-satellite company, wants to use its constellation to monitor the entire planet -- Every Square Meter, Every Hour. This entire network would cost well under a billion USD, and it uses off-the-shelf technology. 

It seems plausible to me that PLARF would be able to put up additional microsats of this type even during a high intensity conflict, e.g., using mobile launchers like for the DF21/26/41. A few ~10 minute contacts per day from a small LEO SAR constellation (i.e., just a few satellites) provides enough targeting data to annihilate a surface fleet in the western Pacific.

Added from comments:

... you can make some good guesses based on physics and the technologies involved. 

1. Very hard to hit a hypersonic missile that is maneuvering on its way in. It's faster than the interceptor missiles and they can't anticipate its trajectory if it, e.g., selects a random maneuver pattern. 

2. I don't think there are good countermeasures for hiding the carrier from LEO SAR. I don't even think there are good countermeasures against final targeting seekers (IR/radar) on the ASBM (or a hypersonic cruise missile) but this depends on details. 

3. If the satellite has the target acquired during the final approach it can transmit the coordinates to the missile in flight and the missile does not have to depend on the seeker. On the Chinese side it is claimed that the ASBM can receive both satellite and OTH radar targeting info while in flight. This seems plausible technologically, and similar capability is already present in PLAAF AAM (i.e., mid-flight targeting data link from jet which launched the AAM). 

4. The radar cross section of a large ship is orders of magnitude larger than, e.g., a jet fighter. The payload of a DF21/26/17 is much larger than an AAM so I would guess the seeker could be much more powerful than the IR/AESA seeker in, e.g., PL-15 or similar. (Note PL-15 and PL-XX/21 have very long (BVR) engagement ranges, like 150km or even 400km and this is against aircraft targets, not massive ships.) The IR/radar seeker in an ASBM could be comparable to those in a jet fighter. 

I seriously doubt you can hide a big ship from a hypersonic missile seeker that is much larger and more powerful than anything on an AAM, possibly as powerful as the sensors on a jet fighter. 

On launch the missile will have a good fix on the target location from the satellite data. In the ~10m time of flight the uncertainty in the location of, e.g., a carrier is ~10km. So the seeker needs to find the target in a region of roughly that size, assuming no in-flight update of target location. 

https://www.iiss.org/public... 

https://sameerjoshi73.mediu... 

Finally, keep in mind that sensor (both the missile seeker and on the satellite) and AI/ML capability are improving rapidly, so the trend is definitely against the carrier.

USN guy: We'll just hide the carrier from the satellite and missile seekers using, you know, countermeasures!  [Aside: don't cut my carrier budget!]

USAF guy: Uh, the much smaller AESA/IR seeker on their AAM can easily detect an aircraft from much longer ranges. How will you hide a huge ship?

USN guy: We'll just shoot down the maneuvering hypersonic missile using, you know, methods. [Aside: don't cut my carrier budget!]

Missile defense guy: Can you explain to us how to do that? If the incoming missile maneuvers we have to adapt the interceptor trajectory (in real time) to where we project the missile to be after some delay. But we can't know its trajectory ahead of time, unlike for a ballistic (non-maneuvering) warhead.

PRC ASBM Test in South China Sea

 

This is an interesting discussion of PRC Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), including the DF21, DF26, and DF17 systems. You can set the captions to English if necessary. 

In response to US activity in the South China Sea and elsewhere, PRC recently conducted a test of DF21 and DF26 in the open ocean. Reportedly, a US "Cobra Ball" RC135S missile intelligence aircraft was present to monitor the activity. 

The YouTube video discusses PRC ASBM capabilities, including 

1. Infrared and radar final targeting

2. Maneuver capability

3. Capability of the missile to receive (ground based) over-the-horizon radar and satellite information while in flight. 

These are the frequent subject of speculation in Western sources: "There is a long kill chain and we are not sure whether it is operational..." etc.

Assuming that PRC ASBM have these capabilities, which seems quite plausible to me, this test was presumably a demonstration for the US, to make sure that our military appreciates the PLARF ability to hit a moving target (e.g., US aircraft carrier) at sea. Once this mutual understanding is in place, FONOPs in the South China Sea become mere theatrics for the dim witted.

See related posts

The Future of the U.S. Aircraft Carrier: Fearsome Warship or Expensive Target? (Heritage panel; video) 

On the military balance of power in the Western Pacific (South China Sea, ASBM, etc.)

Machine intelligence threatens overpriced aircraft carriers (first principles analysis of final targeting problem)

A2AD fait accompli? (Yaogan satellite surveillance of the western Pacific)

Geostrategy and US-China Military Competition

I've been asked to write something about PRC military buildup and a potential Taiwan (TW) conflict. 

1. My perspective and bona fides: My father was a KMT officer, my mother's father was a KMT general and that side of the family is related to Chiang Kai Shek by marriage. I have relatives both in PRC and TW. My wife is a graduate of National Taiwan University. I should be biased in favor of TW and against CPC but I am a realist and rationalist so I call things as I see them. 

2. PRC military technology has reached parity with the US and, overall, surpassed Russia. PLARF (dedicated rocket forces) may be decisive in a conflict in the pacific. They may have achieved A2AD and can make it very costly for the US navy to operate anywhere near TW. 

3. Specifically, long range missile attack on surface ships, using initial targeting via satellites and drones, and final targeting from sensors on the missile itself, is probably a mature technology now and difficult to defeat with countermeasures / missile defense. 

4. US estimates of PRC nuclear weapons stockpile have barely changed in 30y and are likely highly unreliable. Based on production capabilities alone they may already have ~1000 warheads (if not now, in a few years), and the ability to target the entire US. PRC is building up its arsenal to ensure that the US understands that they have a reliable MAD capability. 

5. PRC can easily blockade TW if desired, and (at cost of significant escalation) can probably also blockade Japan and S. Korea as well. All of these countries import ~90% of energy and ~50% of food calories, so a protracted blockade would have serious impact. 

6. I don’t believe PRC has near term plans to invade TW, but they have to maintain the capability to deter any change in the status quo. Both sides prefer the status quo but accidents can happen. 

7. Thanks to stupid US strategy re: Ukraine, PRC can rely on Russian energy in the future and will become much more resistant to naval blockade (e.g., of oil supplies transiting the Malacca Strait). In other words, dumb US neocons solved PRC’s energy security problem for them. 

No one talks about this because US strategy has been brain dead for a long time. No one even talks, in the immediate aftermath, about the trillions of dollars and millions of lives wasted over 20y in the Iraq/Afghanistan tragedies. Cui bono?

8. PRC spends a smaller fraction of GDP on defense than the US, but because they have mastered the entire military technology stack cost estimates should be PPP adjusted. After PPP adjustment the PRC economy is substantially larger than the US economy. This, plus the fact that their manufacturing capacity (e.g., ship building) is far beyond that of the US, means that their overall capability to produce war materiel (i.e., to engage in a rapid buildup on, e.g., a 5y timescale) has easily surpassed ours. Anyone following their recent naval or air power or missile or satellite build up can see that this is the case.

I'll be discussing some of these topics with Lyle Goldstein (US Naval War College, Watson China Initiative at Brown University; BA Harvard, PhD Princeton) in a future podcast.

See also this documentary produced by the US Army University Press. Queued to start at discussion of missile technology and nuclear weapons.

 

 

Panic bells, it's red alert 

There's something here from somewhere else 

The war machine springs to life 

Opens up one eager eye 

Focusing it on the sky 

-- 99 Luftballons