Combat Drones

These are inexpensive, slow-moving drones -- but potentially quite effective. The Turkish drone should have "lock in" capability on stationary targets, so that the radio link to the operator is unnecessary near the end of the flight (i.e., the drone is invulnerable to jamming near the target).

A larger drone such as an ASBM (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile) or UAV would not need the operator to perform the targeting  -- it could have enough AI/ML to recognize an aircraft carrier from ~10km distance (e.g., using some combination of visual, IR, radar imaging). Given a satellite fix on the carrier location, just launch to that coordinate and let the AI/ML do final targeting.

See also

Death from the Sky: Drone Assassination

Assassination by Drone

Strategic Implications of Drone/Missile Strikes on Saudi Arabia

Strategic Implications of Drone/Missile Strikes on Saudi Arabia

The Iranian / Houthi drone shown above might look like a toy, but it is likely capable of flying hundreds of miles, perhaps using GPS guidance and optical imaging for final targeting. Compare to the hobbyist radio controlled jet aircraft in the video at bottom. These weapons are inexpensive and easy to engineer, yet potentially very effective.

In Machine Intelligence Threatens Overpriced Aircraft Carriers (2017) I noted that

Within ~10y (i.e., well within projected service life of US carriers) I expect missile systems of the type currently only possessed by Russia and PRC to be available to lesser powers. I expect that a road-mobile ASBM weapon with good sensor/ML capability, range ~1500km, will be available for ~$10M. Given a rough (~10km accuracy) fix on a carrier, this missile will be able to arrive in that area and then use ML/sensors for final targeting. There is no easy defense against such weapons. Cruise missiles which pose a similar threat will also be exported. This will force the US to be much more conservative in the use of its carriers, not just against Russia and PRC, but against smaller countries as well.

... Basic missile technology is old, well-understood, and already inexpensive (compared, e.g., to the cost of fighter jets). ML/sensor capability is evolving rapidly and will be enormously better in 10y. ... Despite BS claims over the years (and over $100B spent by the US), anti-missile technology is not effective...

One only has to localize the carrier to within few x 10km for initial launch, letting the smart final targeting do the rest. The initial targeting location can be obtained through many methods, including aircraft/drone probes, targeting overflight by another kind of missile, LEO micro-satellites, or even (surreptitious) cooperation from Russia/PRC (or a commercial vendor!) via their satellite network.

Anthony Cordesman writes for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):

The Strategic Implications of the Strikes on Saudi Arabia:

.. UCAV/RPV (drone) and cruise missile attacks offer precision strike options with high levels of accuracy from small, easily dispersible systems that are very hard to locate and target... Iranian systems do have both GPS and imagery capability to home in even more precisely on a target. UCAV/RPVs and cruise missiles are also small air defense targets compared to fighters, can fly evasively, and have flight profiles that are hard to detect. Saudi fighter and SAM intercept capabilities to cover wide areas with any effectiveness are uncertain, and ballistic missile defenses can only cope with a different threat.

This is why the success of the existing strikes will – at a minimum — act as a major incentive to Iran, the Hezbollah, and other such powers to develop such forces as well as precision guided ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

... Looking further into the future, the strikes on Saudi Arabia provide a clear strategic warning that the US era of air supremacy in the Gulf, and the near U.S. monopoly on precision strike capability, is rapidly fading. UCAV/RPVs, cruise missiles, and precision strike ballistic missiles are all entering Iranian inventory and have begun to spread to the Houthi and Hezbollah. Nations like North Korea are following, and other areas of military confrontation like India and Pakistan will follow. All of these systems can be used at low levels of conflict intensity and in “gray area” wars...

We are entering an era in which an inexpensive, easy to obtain device can fly rapidly (~500mph if jet powered), evasively, and automatically to a designated GPS coordinate. It can even use visual or radar information to adjust final targeting. Terrorists could easily attack any public event: i.e., large stadium (sporting event or concert), public speech by politician, etc. They could also attack key infrastructure such as a power station or oil pipeline/refinery. It's the era of the mobile smart IED...

See also Assassination by Drone.

Death from the Sky: Drone Assassination

This is a ~$1000 drone, max velocity ~70kph (~45mph), range ~30min flying time, controller range ~5km. It's only 1 kilo -- so payload is limited. It is optimized for photography, not for speed or range or payload. But it gives you an idea of what is possible at the same cost as, say, a couple of cheap AR15s... A real hobbyist could construct something cheaper, faster, with bigger payload. But this you can buy with one click ready to go.

It's never been easier for a bad guy to deliver an explosive charge (e.g., fraction of a kilo) to a target from a mile away. Operating a drone like this takes almost no training.

Defeating two of them coming from different directions, staggered by a few seconds, would be extremely hard even for an active security detail. Follow the target in their car and detonate the drone near the gas tank when the car stops at an intersection. Or have the drone waiting near the intersection if you know the route in advance.

If your target is commercial aviation, hit a 747 near its fuel tank as it waits to take off. A sitting duck, and no fooling around with military gear like MANPADs -- remember, you can be a mile or more away from the airport, sitting on your hotel room balcony, or in your car ready to hit the freeway.

Will this ever happen? Thank goodness terrorists tend to be incompetent... But 9/11 was a good example of what can happen when they are not.

See also Assassination by Drone.

Assassination by Drone

I have been waiting for this to happen:

Reuters: CARACAS - Drones loaded with explosives detonated close to a military event where Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was giving a speech on Saturday, but he and top government officials alongside him escaped unharmed from what Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez called an “attack” targeting the leftist leader. Seven National Guard soldiers were injured, Rodriguez added.

See this 2015 post on drone racing and ask yourself how you'd stop one of these drones from getting close to its target.

Countermeasures will be quite difficult, especially if drone operators use sophisticated frequency hopping control.

One doesn't even need pilot operators. The drones can be programmed to fly to a GPS coordinate using an evasive approach.

1. The exact coordinate can be marked by someone in the audience of a public appearance of the target.

2. It would be a formidable challenge even to stop some medium sized drones, each with a few kilo payload, from flying through the windows of the Oval Office (known GPS coordinate; known presence of targets at specific times).




This is still Science Fiction, for now:




Twenty years ago I told a PhD student that a terrorist -- willing to die and able to fly an airplane -- could probably take out the White House. After 9/11 he reminded me that I had identified this hole in the system well in advance. It's the same thing here with small and medium size drones. They are accessible to non-state actors with limited resources, and very difficult to defeat, even for state security.

Drones at War: Lessons from Ukraine

Russian forces seem to have integrated both Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) and real-time artillery targeting into drone warfare. To a technologist, this seems quite easy and predictable -- the main challenges are training and organization. Nevertheless, opposing militaries such as NATO might be unprepared for these new tactics.

Land Warfare in Europe: Lessons and Recommendations from the War in Ukraine: Shortly before dawn on the morning of July 11, 2014, elements of Ukraine’s 24th Mechanized Brigade met a catastrophic end near the Ukrainian border town of Zelenopillya. After a mass rocket artillery barrage lasting just three minutes, the combat power of two battalions of the 24th Mechanized Brigade was gone. What remained was a devastated landscape, burning vehicles and equipment, 30 dead and 90 wounded. According to multiple accounts, the Ukrainians were on the receiving end of a new and dangerous Russian weapon: the 122-mm Tornado Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Capable of covering a wide fire area with a deadly combination of Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs), scatter mines and thermobaric warheads, the attack had not only destroyed the combat power of the Ukrainian forces, it offered a glimpse into the changing nature of Land Warfare in Europe. The battlefield was becoming deadlier.

... NATO armies should prepare to fight an ECM battle to keep their drones aloft in addition to the Anti-Access/Area Denial fight for the skies.

Phillip A. Karber, Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory & U.S. Army Capabilities Center (ARCIC)):

The surprising thing about the Russian use of drones is not in the mix of vehicles themselves or their unique characteristics, but rather in their ability to combine multiple sensing platforms into a real-time targeting system for massed, not precision, fire strikes. There are three critical components to the Russian method: the sensor platforms which are often used at multiple altitudes over the same target with complimentary imaging; a command-and-control system, which nets their input and delivers a strike order; and, an on-call ground-based delivery system which can produce strikes within short order.

... The author personally witnessed a fire-strike east of Mariupol in September 2014 in which an overflying drone identified a Ukrainian position, and destroyed it with a “GRAD” BM-21 MLRS [ range: 20-30 km ] within 15 minutes of the initial over-flight and then returned shortly after to do an immediate bomb-damage assessment. Last month when hit by a “GRAD” fragment in a similar strike, there were two UAVs over us – a quad-copter at 800ft and small fixed wing drone at about 2,500ft.

DJI Mavic

$750 without controller (use your phone) or $1000 with DJI controller. Weighs about 1.5 lbs.