I've been asked to write something about PRC military buildup and a potential Taiwan (TW) conflict.
1. My perspective and bona fides: My father was a KMT officer, my mother's father was a KMT general and that side of the family is related to Chiang Kai Shek by marriage. I have relatives both in PRC and TW. My wife is a graduate of National Taiwan University. I should be biased in favor of TW and against CPC but I am a realist and rationalist so I call things as I see them.
2. PRC military technology has reached parity with the US and, overall, surpassed Russia. PLARF (dedicated rocket forces) may be decisive in a conflict in the pacific. They may have achieved A2AD and can make it very costly for the US navy to operate anywhere near TW.
3. Specifically, long range missile attack on surface ships, using initial targeting via satellites and drones, and final targeting from sensors on the missile itself, is probably a mature technology now and difficult to defeat with countermeasures / missile defense.
4. US estimates of PRC nuclear weapons stockpile have barely changed in 30y and are likely highly unreliable. Based on production capabilities alone they may already have ~1000 warheads (if not now, in a few years), and the ability to target the entire US. PRC is building up its arsenal to ensure that the US understands that they have a reliable MAD capability.
5. PRC can easily blockade TW if desired, and (at cost of significant escalation) can probably also blockade Japan and S. Korea as well. All of these countries import ~90% of energy and ~50% of food calories, so a protracted blockade would have serious impact.
6. I don’t believe PRC has near term plans to invade TW, but they have to maintain the capability to deter any change in the status quo. Both sides prefer the status quo but accidents can happen.
7. Thanks to stupid US strategy re: Ukraine, PRC can rely on Russian energy in the future and will become much more resistant to naval blockade (e.g., of oil supplies transiting the Malacca Strait). In other words, dumb US neocons solved PRC’s energy security problem for them.
No one talks about this because US strategy has been brain dead for a long time. No one even talks, in the immediate aftermath, about the trillions of dollars and millions of lives wasted over 20y in the Iraq/Afghanistan tragedies. Cui bono?
8. PRC spends a smaller fraction of GDP on defense than the US, but because they have mastered the entire military technology stack cost estimates should be PPP adjusted. After PPP adjustment the PRC economy is substantially larger than the US economy. This, plus the fact that their manufacturing capacity (e.g., ship building) is far beyond that of the US, means that their overall capability to produce war materiel (i.e., to engage in a rapid buildup on, e.g., a 5y timescale) has easily surpassed ours. Anyone following their recent naval or air power or missile or satellite build up can see that this is the case.
I'll be discussing some of these topics with Lyle Goldstein (US Naval War College, Watson China Initiative at Brown University; BA Harvard, PhD Princeton) in a future podcast.
See also this documentary produced by the US Army University Press. Queued to start at discussion of missile technology and nuclear weapons.
1. The US stopped TSMC from fabbing leading edge Kirin CPUs for Huawei (designed by Huawei's chip design subsidiary HiSilicon). These were used in their smartphones. For a year or two Huawei was arguably the leading smartphone maker in the world and looked entirely capable of competing against Samsung and Apple. US Nat Sec concerns had more to do with Huawei's 5G business. But 5G infrastructure doesn't use leading edge chips (the base stations are big and don't rely on battery power the way phones do). The connection between Huawei's smartphone business and its 5G infrastructure business is very indirect -- they are entirely different businesses.
2. No sanctions were applied to ZTE which, unlike Huawei, is an actual state-owned entity and had previously been on the US entity list. ZTE also sells 5G infrastructure equipment. It is flourishing while Huawei is starting to run low on the non-leading edge chips (e.g., >20nm process) it buys for its base stations.
It's hard to explain what the US was up to with Huawei -- I would say it's a good example of the kind of incoherent "emergent" policy that Hanania writes about in his new book.
If you believe all the Western propaganda about Huawei and Xinjiang produced over the last few years you might be an NPC or at least someone who doesn't properly calibrate their Bayesian updates. As such it isn't really worth my effort to engage with you.
Regarding PRC invasion of Taiwan, missile technology, etc. see
... The US/NATO command may be woofing just to get more ships and planes funded, but woofing can go badly wrong. The people you’re woofing at may think you really mean it. That’s what came very close to happening in the 1983 Able Archer NATO exercises. The woofing by Reagan and Thatcher in the leadup to those exercises was so convincing to the Soviet woof-ees that even the moribund USSR came close to responding in real—like nuclear—ways.
That’s how contingency plans, domestic political theatrics, and funding scams can feed into each other and lead to real wars.
Military forces develop contingency plans. That’s part of their job. Some of the plans to fight China are crazy, but some are just plausible enough to be worrying, because somebody might start thinking they could work.
... What you do with a place like Xinjiang, if you’re a CIA/DoD planner, is file it under “promote insurgency” — meaning “start as many small fires as possible,” rather than “invade and begin a conventional war.”
And in the meantime, you keep working on the real complaints of the Uyghur and other non-Han ethnic groups, so that if you do need to start a conventional war in the Formosa Straits, you can use the Uyghur as a diversion, a sacrifice, by getting them to rise up and be massacred. Since there’s a big Han-Chinese population in Xinjiang, as the map shows, you can hope to stir up the sort of massacre/counter-massacre whipsaw that leaves evil memories for centuries, leading to a permanent weakening of the Chinese state.
This is a nasty strategy, but it’s a standard imperial practice, low-cost — for the empire, not the local population, of course. It costs those people everything, but empires are not sentimental about such things.
... The Uyghur in Xinjiang would serve the same purpose as the Iraqi Kurds: “straw dogs destined for sacrifice.” If you want to get really cynical, consider that the reprisals they’d face from an enraged Chinese military would be even more useful to the US/NATO side than their doomed insurgency itself.
Atrocity propaganda is very important in 21st c warfare. At the moment, there’s no evidence of real, mass slaughter in Xinjiang, yet we’re already getting propaganda claims about it. Imagine what US/NATO could make out of the bloody aftermath of a doomed insurgency. Well, assuming that US/NATO survived a war with China, a pretty dicey assumption. More likely, CNN, BBC, and NYT would be the first to welcome our new overlords, Kent Brockman style. Those mainstream-media whores aren’t too bright but Lord, they’re agile.
... Xinjiang, by contrast, can easily be imagined as One Giant Concentration Camp. After all, our leading “expert” on the province has never been there, and neither have his readers.
... The era of naval war based on carrier groups is over. They know that, even if they won’t say it.
If there’s a real war with China, the carriers will wait it out in San Diego harbor. I don’t say Honolulu, because even that wouldn’t be safe enough.
I’m not denigrating the courage or dedication of the crews and officers of USN vessels. At any level below JCOS, most of them are believers. But their belief is increasingly besieged and difficult to sustain, like an Episcopalian at Easter. You just can’t think too long about how cheap and effective antiship missiles are and still be a believer in aircraft carriers. As platforms of gunboat diplomacy against weak powers, they’re OK.
... The thing is, and it’s weird you even have to say this: China is a big strong country coming out of an era of deep national humiliation and suffering, proud of its new prosperity. China’s success in lifting a desperately poor population into something like prosperity will likely be the biggest story from this era, when the canonical histories get distilled.
A nation hitting this stage is likely to include a lot of people, especially young men, who are itching to show what their country can do. Their patriotic eagerness is no doubt as gullible as most, but it’s real, and if you pay any attention in the online world, you can’t help seeing it.
People who mouth off about China never seem to imagine that anyone in China might hear, because as we are told over and over again, China-is-an-authoritarian-state. The implication is that nobody in China has any of the nationalistic fervor that we take for granted in our own Anglo states.
... Given the history of US/China relations, from the pogroms against Chinese immigrants to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, through the demonization of Chinese mainlanders in the Cold War (which I remember distinctly from elementary school scare movies), the endless attempts to start insurgencies in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Fujian, to the nonstop violence and abuse of Asians in America, you don’t need to find reasons for Chinese people to want a war.
The odd thing is that most of them don’t seem to. That’s a remarkable testimony to the discipline and good sense of the Chinese public…so far. And it’s also, if you’re thinking clearly, a good reason not to keep provoking China in such gross, pointless ways. A population with that level of discipline and unity, matched with zooming prosperity, technical expertise, and pride on emerging from a long nightmare, is not one to woof at.
Of course the plan in the Pentagon is not real war. The plan is to slow China down, trip it up, “wrong-foot it” as they say in the Commonwealth.
... So what will China do about Taiwan? China could take it right now, if it wanted to pay the price. Everyone knows that, though many fake-news sites have responded with childish, ridiculous gung-ho stories about how “Taiwan Could Win.”
But will China invade? No. Not right now anyway. It doesn’t need to. The Chinese elite has its own constituencies, like all other polities (including “totalitarian” ones), and has to answer to them as circumstances change.
So far China has been extraordinarily patient, a lot more patient than we’d be if China was promising to fight to the death for, say, Long Island. But that can change. Because, as I never tire of repeating, the enemy of the moment has constituencies too. And has to answer to them.
So what happens if the US succeeds in hamstringing China’s economy? Welp, what’s the most reliable distraction a gov’t can find when it wants to unite a hard-pressed population against some distant enemy?
That’s when China might actually do something about Taiwan. ...
Note Added: Some readers may be alarmed that the War Nerd does not seem to accept the (Western) mass media propaganda about Xinjiang. Those readers might have poor memories, or are too young to know about, e.g., fake WMD or "babies taken out of incubators" or the countless other manufactured human rights abuses we read about in reliable journals like the New York Times or Washington Post.
Take these recent examples of US journalism on Afghanistan:
The fake drone strike that killed 10 innocent family members, one of our last acts as we abandoned Afghanistan. (Fake because we probably did it just to show we could "strike back" at the bad guys.) Non-Western media reported this as a catastrophic failure almost immediately. But very few people in the US knew it until the Pentagon issued an apology in a late Friday afternoon briefing just recently.
The drone strike was in retaliation for the suicide bombing at Kabul airport, in which (as reported by the Afghan government) ~200 people died. But evidence suggests that only a small fraction of these people were killed by bomb -- most of the 200 may have been shot by US and "coalition" (Turkish?) soldiers who might have panicked after the bombing. This is covered widely outside the US but not here.
If you want to understand the incredibly thin and suspicious sourcing of the "Uighur genocide" story, see here or just search for Adrian Zenz.
Just a few years ago there were plenty of Western travelers passing through Xinjiang, even by bicycle, vlogging and posting their videos on YouTube. I followed these YouTubers at the time because of my own travel interest in western and south-western China, not for any political reason.
If you watch just a few of these you'll get an entirely different impression of the situation on the ground than you would get from Western media. For more, see this comment thread:
I want to be clear that because PRC is an authoritarian state their reaction to the Islamic terror attacks in Xinjiang circa 2015 was probably heavy handed and I am sure some of the sad stories told about people being arrested, held without trial, etc. are true. But I am also sure that if you visit Xinjiang and ask (non-Han) taxi drivers, restaurant owners, etc. about the level of tension you will get a very different impression than what is conveyed by Western media.
...
No nation competing in geopolitics is without sin. One aspect of that sin (both in US and PRC): use of mass media propaganda to influence domestic public opinion.
If you want to be "reality based" you need to look at the strongest evidence from both sides.
...
Note to the credulous: The CIA venture fund InQTel was an investor in my first startup, which worked in crypto technology. We worked with CIA, VOA, NED ("National Endowment for Democracy" HA HA HA) on defeating the PRC firewall in the early internet era. I know a fair bit about how this all works -- NGO cutouts, fake journalists, policy grifters in DC, etc. etc. Civilians have no idea.
At the time I felt (and still sort of feel) that keeping the internet free and open is a noble cause. But do I know FOR SURE that state security works DIRECTLY with media and NGOs to distort the truth (i.e., lies to the American people, Iraq WMD yada yada). Yes, I know for sure and it's easy to detect the pattern just by doing a tiny bit of research on people like Cockerell or Zenz.
...
Keep in mind I'm not a "dove" -- MIC / intel services / deep state *has to* protect against worst case outcomes and assume the worst about other states.
They have to do nasty stuff. I'm not making moral judgements here.
But a *consequence* of this is that you have to be really careful about information sources in order to stay reality based...
It seems implausible to me that PRC would risk an invasion of Taiwan in the near term, absent a very strong provocation such as an outright declaration of independence. Mastro's recent article in Foreign Affairs: China's Taiwan Temptation made the case for potential near term conflict, and caused quite a stir among analysts.
My guess is that PRC already has the capability to take Taiwan, but not without significant risk. However, as long as they continue to believe that time is on their side an invasion seems unlikely.
Some comments:
1. PRC would have local air and naval superiority at the beginning of the conflict.
2. I am uncertain as to the details of lift/amphibious assault -- discussed by Goldstein on the panel. This is the main failure mode for PLA.
3. I am uncertain as to Taiwan's will to fight. A quick surrender is not excluded, in my opinion. It seems that most US planners do not understand this.
4. Most westerners fail to understand that this is a frozen civil war, with very strong and emotional commitments from the PRC side. The involvement of Japan in this conflict, given their history of aggression in Asia and previous colonial occupation of Taiwan, could easily get them nuked again (this time with much greater megatonnage). It is unclear whether the present leadership of Japan appreciates this sufficiently.
5. The interests of the average person in the US or Japan (or any Asian country) are best served by working very hard to avoid this conflict.
What is happening across the Taiwan Strait?
In March, Admiral Philip Davidson, then commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific (INDOPACOM), said in a hearing before Congress that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could take place within six years. His successor, Admiral John Aquilino, agreed that such an attack could occur sooner “than most think.” More recently, however, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, testified that he believes that China has little intention to take Taiwan by force, and that the capability to do so remains a goal rather than a reality.
On the other hand, the Chinese military has increased pressure on Taiwan in the past year, flying into the island’s air defense identification zone on numerous occasions. During one day in June, China flew 28 military aircraft toward Taiwan, the largest number in a single day, perhaps in response to G7 and NATO statements on China and Taiwan.
On July 19, 2021, the National Committee hosted a virtual program with Lyle Goldstein and Oriana Skylar Mastro to discuss China/Taiwan/U.S. military relations. NCUSCR President Stephen Orlins moderated and NCUSCR Director Admiral Dennis Blair offered commentary.
Lyle J. Goldstein is a research professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the Naval War College (NWC) and an affiliate of its new Russia Maritime Studies Institute. Founding director of CMSI and author of dozens of articles on Chinese security policy, he focuses on Chinese undersea warfare. On the broader subject of U.S.-China relations, Dr. Goldstein published Meeting China Halfway in 2015. Over the last several years, he has focused on the North Korea crisis.
Dr. Goldstein received his bachelor’s degree in government from Harvard, his master’s degree in strategic studies and international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and his doctoral degree in politics from Princeton. He speaks Russian as well as Chinese.
Oriana Skylar Mastro is a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy; a senior non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; an inaugural Wilson Center China fellow; and a fellow in the National Committee’s Public Intellectuals Program. She has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Survival, and Asian Security. Her 2019 book, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime, won the 2020 American Political Science Association International Security Section Best Book by an Untenured Faculty Member.
Dr. Mastro holds a B.A. in East Asian studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University.
Added from comments:
Russia is discussed by the panelists. My guess is that if PRC launched a surprise invasion of TW they would just sit it out. The panelists go so far as to speculate that Russia might collaborate with PRC in the planning of an invasion, and could even provide some geopolitical distraction in support of it. I'm not sure I believe that -- the risk of losing surprise due to information leakage from the Russian side would be a big negative against coordination.
There would be huge repercussions from nuking Japan (PRC actually has a no first use policy), but the emotional effect of, e.g., seeing a large PLAN ship sunk by a Japanese missile would be very strong. Remember, to PRC it looks like a (very much still disliked) foreign power intervening in an internal Chinese dispute. Sort of like Britain helping the confederacy during our civil war, but much worse. At the beginning of a TW invasion PRC might issue some kind of very strong ultimatum of non-interference to all parties (US, Japan, etc.) and then feel justified if the ultimatum is not obeyed.
Please don't confuse descriptive analysis with normative analysis. It's important to understand how this looks from the other side, in order to predict their behavior.
PRC faced down the US on the Korean peninsula when they had NO nuclear deterrent. (The historical record is clear that the US seriously considered using nukes against PRC over Korea and over TW in the past.) This would be a fight over (in their minds) actual Chinese territory, not Korea, and today they have a very credible MAD deterrent.
Re: item #3 above, I would like to see a detailed analysis of Taiwan's senior military leadership and their political leanings. I suspect that among them are many descendants of KMT military officers (like my father and grandfather), who largely still support the KMT political party and not the pro-independence DPP. These officers might lead a military coup in the event of a PRC invasion -- especially if it is a reaction to a DPP proclamation of independence, or other US-backed provocation.
This interview with Professor Alexander Huang of Tamkang University (Taiwan) Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies addresses the possibility of direct participation by the US and Japan in defense of Taiwan. In my opinion, Huang is realistic and well-calibrated.
This is a clear explanation of the status quo, with opinion poll results:
I recommend this episode of The Red Line geostrategy podcast: Japan and The Quad.
Serious analysts from the Asia-Pacific region (e.g., Australia, India, Japan, etc.) are often much better than their US counterparts. US analysts tend to misperceive local political and economic realities, and can be captives of Washington DC groupthink (e.g., about weapons systems like aircraft carriers or the F35 or missile defense).
For example, Australian analysts acknowledged the vulnerability of US aircraft carriers to PRC ASBM and cruise missiles well before it became common for US analysts to openly admit the problem. The earliest technical analysis I could find of PRC satellite capability to track US surface ships in the Pacific came from an Indian military think tank (see maps below), at a time when many US "experts" denied that it was possible.
In this podcast Japan's reliance on sea lanes for energy, food, and raw materials is given proper emphasis. Japan imports ~60% of its food calories and essentially all of its oil. The stituation is similar for S. Korea and Taiwan. It is important to note that blocking sea transport to Taiwan and Japan does not require PLAN blue water dominance. ASBM and cruise missiles which threaten aircraft carriers can also hold oil tankers and global shipping at risk from launch sites which are on or near the Asian mainland. Missile + drone + AI/ML technology completely alters the nature of sea blockade, but most strategic planners do not yet realize this. Serious conflict in this region would likely wreak havoc on the economies of Taiwan, S. Korea, and Japan.
Red Line: ... In seeking to counter an ever-expanding China, Tokyo is turning abroad in search of allies. Key to this is the recent revival of "The Quad", a strategic dialogue between the US, Australia, Japan and India. Will it be enough to counter their rising neighbour across the East China Sea? Is this the first step to creating an "Asian NATO", and how will China respond?
Guests:
Owen Swift
Geopolitics and defence analyst specialising in Australian & East Asian Defence
Written with organisations including The Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Monash University. Senior Producer and resident Asia-Pacific expert at The Red Line
John Nilsson-Wright
Senior Lecturer on Japanese Geopolitics and International Relations for Cambridge University. Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia for Chatham House. Author of the book Unequal Allies about the post-war relationship between Japan and the United States.
John Coyne
Head of the Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Head of Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement at ASPI. One of the most trusted experts when it comes to the dynamics of East Asia for Australia and the United States.
Part 1: The Return from Armageddon (02:52)
Owen Swift overviews Japan's place in East Asia and the fundamental geographic challenges that inform its geopolitics.
We tackle Japan's inability to domestically provide the resources and food that its population needs, and how it has historically dealt with this insecurity.
The consequences of World War 2 wreaked havoc on Japan's economy, political system and territorial holdings. We analyse the short and long term consequences of this, and seek to understand why it was that Japan took a positive view of the US occupation, comparing it to the option of a possible partial USSR occupation.
In the 1980s some thought Japan was on a path to overtake the US economically. While that hasn't come to pass, we look at what it was that made Japan's economic miracle, and the effect that US involvement has today.
We look at domestic issues in Japan, including the drastic demographic decline, their ongoing 'defensive only' posture, and the policy options on the table for balancing against the rise of China.
Finally we overview Japan's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, analysing who it has the best relations with. We look at the extensive investments and infrastructure development Japan is undertaking in ASEAN states, and its cooperation with India and Australia in recent years.
Part 2: The Grand Dilemma (17:56)
John Nilsson-Wright helps us understand the fundamental shifts in Japanese politics and foreign policy, including Article 9, the tension between the Yoshida doctrine, public opinion and US pressure within Japan, and the country's re-entry into the sphere of great power competition.
We examine the extent of Japan's military presence in the Indo-Pacific; looking at its exercises with other powers and the concerns its neighbours have, some of whom still bear significant scars from World War 2.
South Korea's relationship with Japan is one that, on the surface, seems like it should be closer than it is. We analyse why it is that despite their mutual interest in countering North Korea and China, their close geography and both being under the US umbrella, the two states have been unable to overcome enormous domestic resentment and historic scars.
Japan's constitution has very tight constraints on what it can do militarily. Nilsson-Wright helps us understand the details of these restrictions and their history over the past few decades. We look at how the legal interpretation of the article has changed as Japan's needs have changed.
We also look at Japan's expanding concept of national interest, which began as a purely defensive, geographically limited concept, but that has continued to expand in recent years. We contrast that with the difficulty the government has had with domestic views of Japan's role on the global stage.
We tackle territorial issues including the Kuril and Sakhalin Islands, and look at Japan's role in a potential Taiwanese conflict.
Part 3: A United Front? (43:48)
John Coyne a takes us through the details of the Quad, and the roles that its constituent members play.
We look at Japan's re-examination of their supply chains, their development of strategic depth and the recent news that they are considering abolishing the 1% of GDP cap on military spending.
Coyne helps us understand what the Quad actually is - It is not and does not seek to be an Asian NATO - just as ASEAN is not an Asian EU. We look at what the limitations are for each of the states involved, particularly India.
We look at the actual relationships and cooperation that has been seen between Quad members. With Japan's newfound willingness to be involved in military operations, we examine how closely they will work with Australia, India and the United States, and the extent to which the Quad is more than just symbolic.
We then turn to China's response. Is China likely to seek a grouping like the Quad in opposition to it? Can the Quad actually contain China or its navy in any practical sense? What will China do if cooperation tightens?
We look at how China has already sought to hit back, targeting Australia in particular with the "14 Grievances", which were delivered as a consequence of the deterioration of their relationship. Australia's membership and participation in the Quad is a key part of this deterioration.
Finally we look at how the Quad members have worked to strategically separate from China, such as Japan's work to defeat China's monopoly on the rare earths industry.
Excerpt below from China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites and the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile – An Update, International Strategic and Security Studies Programme (ISSSP), National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS -- India), December 2013. With present technology it is easy to launch LEO (Low Earth Orbit) micro-satellites on short notice to track ships, but PRC has had a much more sophisticated system in place for almost a decade.
Authors: Professor S. Chandrashekar and Professor Soma Perumal
We can state with confidence that the Yaogan satellite constellation and its associated ASBM system provide visible proof of Chinese intentions and capabilities to keep ACG strike groups well away from the Chinese mainland.
Though the immediate purpose of the system is to deter the entry of a hostile aircraft carrier fleet into waters that directly threatens its security interests especially during a possible conflict over Taiwan, the same approach can be adopted to deter entry into other areas of strategic interest.
Viewed from this perspective the Chinese do seem to have in place an operational capability for denying or deterring access into areas which it sees as crucial for preserving its sovereignty and security.
Bonus: This political cartoon about the G7 meeting has been widely shared in the sinosphere. Some of the esoteric meaning may be lost on a US audience, but see here for an explanation. Note the device on the table which turns toilet paper into US dollars. The Japanese dog is serving radioactive water to the co-conspirators. Italy, the BRI participant, refuses the drink. France and Germany seem to be thinking about it carefully. Who is the little frog? (Hint: NTD)
Tomorrow night I'm returning to the US. My 9 month sabbatical here went by fast!
Here's a drawing I found while cleaning out my desk. The kids can read English and a few Chinese characters, too.
Here are some photos I took at the airport in Macau on my way back from BGI.
My last official activity here at Academia Sinica will be to give a colloquium in the Institute of Physics. Below are two figures of interest, produced by one of my collaborators. No Harvard, MIT or other Boston area students were harmed ;-)
Reaction time and g -- task is to determine whether a number flashed on a screen is greater or less than 45.
Note 1280 is about 90th percentile in the population (IQ 120) whereas 1560 is about 99th percentile (IQ 135 or so).
Huh? What? But, my Sociology professor told me it's just a social construction! 8-(
We spent today at the Taipei Science Museum. Exhausting, but a lot of fun! Click for larger versions.
They had a nice genetics exhibit.
This is a Galton board or quincunx. It also makes music! The nail lengths vary across the board, so as the balls fall they generate harmonies. The board rotates but is attached to a parabolic (black) backing that amplifies the sound. Max really liked it!
The kids are often as interested in the museum store as in the museum :-)
Sorry for the lack of posts. I just returned from the US and I'm recovering from jetlag in Taipei.
On my last day at Caltech, just for fun, I gave a lunch talk on my genomics work with BGI. I'll give a similar talk next week at the Taiwan National Center for Theoretical Science to an audience of mathematicians and physicists.
During the talk last week I joked that if we discover some genes affecting cognition, it might be more significant than all my work in theoretical physics. I also mentioned that, because sequencing costs are going down exponentially, I occasionally get the feeling that our work is unnecessary: the explosion of genomic data will produce much more powerful results almost by accident in the next decade or two. So why should we kill ourselves today? People in the audience immediately pointed out that this is always the case in science -- you do what you can with current technology, even though your efforts will seem puny when viewed in retrospect by future experimenters with vastly superior capabilities. However, most areas of science aren't moving quite as fast as genomics, so the feeling is especially strong from my vantage point.
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