The shale revolution brought about not only an American competitive advantage in the global oil and gas market, but also an entirely new geopolitical dynamic. Energy is the bedrock of every industrial economy, and even minor shifts in production and prices have had resounding impacts on international diplomacy.
Today, the global energy landscape differs drastically from a decade ago. The U.S. now leads the world in oil production thanks to fracking, and the world is reacting. But even as Russia pivots to China, and Middle Eastern producers try to recalibrate, every oil-producing country faces the same questions about the future of energy: Will renewable energy reign? And how will international relationships fare with this new map? These issues will become even more controversial during the presidential campaigns.
See also Remarks on the Decline of American Empire for earlier discussion of the impact of fracking on geopolitics.
02:35More Bruno, on the Belt and Road initiative.
I was shown the assembly line for the P30 smartphone [~$1k flagship using Huawei chipset] and told that this assembly line just two or three years ago was operated by 140 operators people it is now down to 17 by the end of this year we'll be down to 15 it's a very long assembly line perhaps 200 250 meters takes about 30 minutes more important than the time it takes to assemble a P30 is the time between each unit and that's now down to 29 seconds so every 29 seconds a fully produced P30 comes out at the end 17 people operate now this this assembly line but the remarkable thing is that I actually looked very carefully at what the 17 were doing and it's very obvious they're not doing anything of significance they left there more in order to keep a certain control over the process...
07:17
this is not a new Cold War and I see no indications that were moving in that direction China and the United States continue to be turned towards to each other continue to be very interested in learning from each other and I think this is an important point their way of life their ideology the way they look at the world is not predicated on a negation of the other side the Soviet Union was from the very start a revolutionary movement whose whole identity was the negation of capitalist Western Way of life and organizing society now China and the United States in a way are much less connected they are not part of the same history and their dispute is not a dispute about who is fundamentally right about questions that involved both...
08:39
they're not necessarily involved in a death and life struggle between them the world we live in is I'll sum it up this way a world where and this is I think the puzzling element of it we are neither at war nor at peace we are somewhere in the middle conflict takes below takes place below the threshold of kinetic war and other forms of direct confrontation but it is no less intense because of that...
11:21
the tactics might include the purchase of infrastructure in other states the corruption or blackmail of foreign officials important elements of this new world that is not often talked about [CALLING EPSTEIN AND GHISLAINE MAXWELL] manipulation of energy flows or energy prices all of these elements are magnified in an integrated global economy the networks that bring us together are used as tools or instruments of conflict...
Hi Jen,Columbia Journalism Review (1998): The Myth of Tiananmen. See comments for further discussion...
I really enjoyed your Q&A today. Keep fighting the good fight.
Wikileaks diplomatic cables reveal no mass shootings in Tiananmen Square:
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/89BEIJING18828_a.html
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8555142/Wikileaks-no-bloodshed-inside-Tiananmen-Square-cables-claim.html
Our media has been misrepresenting this historical event for 30 years
now. There was certainly violence, but not in the square itself.
Best wishes,
Steve
Politico (EU): ... In the halls of the Kremlin these days, it’s all about China — and whether or not Moscow can convince Beijing to form an alliance against the West.More Bruno Maçães: podcast interview on his new book Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order. See also Remarks on the Decline of American Empire.
Russia’s obsession with a potential alliance with China was already obvious at the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual gathering of Russia’s biggest foreign policy minds, in 2017.
At their next meeting, late last year, the idea seemed to move from the speculative to something Russia wants to realize. And soon.
... Every Russian speech — from obscure academics to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin himself — played that note and no other. There was even a new sense of desperation in the air.
As Sergey Karaganov, a former adviser to Putin, explained to me at breakfast, now everything must be about China.
... There was no doubt at Valdai that China knows how to do economic growth, and that Russia does not. Russia’s elite — always so ready to resist any sign of Western hegemony — have no problem admitting China’s economic superiority. Their acceptance reminded me of the way Britain gave way to the United States as the world’s dominant economic power.
... In the past, the possibility of an alliance between the two countries had been hampered by China’s reluctance to jeopardize its relations with the U.S. But now that it has already become a target, perhaps it will grow bolder. Every speaker at Valdai tried to push China in that direction.
When Putin finished a fireside chat with policymakers — a set-piece of the conference, where he fields softball questions from the audience — he made a gesture to leave the room, but then quickly rushed back to grab Yang Jiechi, a former Chinese foreign minister and arguably the main architect of the country’s foreign policy. He insisted on walking out with Yang by his side, to the obvious delight of his Chinese guest.
... I met Karaganov again at a meeting with Chinese officials and think tankers in Beijing a few weeks ago. There, a number of Chinese participants said they doubted Russia’s assertions that the world is in the midst of a new Cold War.
Karaganov dedicated himself to convincing them otherwise, arguing with increasing passion that China is deluding itself if it thinks issues between Beijing and Washington can be conveniently resolved to the benefit of both sides.
If Beijing places its bets on peace and cooperation, the great Chinese adventure will come to an end, and China will have to live in the shadow of the U.S. for another generation — perhaps forever, Karaganov said. Chinese authorities, he argued, have no more than five years to make a decision.
The meeting was held under the Chatham House rule, so unfortunately, I cannot report on what the response from the Chinese side was; only Karaganov allowed me to relay his words.
... from my own separate conversations, Chinese officials appear to agree the clock is ticking. They’re just not yet convinced they should choose war — even a Cold War.
