Hypersonic Weapons and Missile Defense

Detailed analysis of boost-glide (BGV) and Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV): physics of interception by US SM-2,3 etc.

Hypersonic Weapons: Vulnerability to Missile Defenses and Comparison to MaRVs 

David Wright and Cameron L. Tracy 

Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

As I concluded long ago, current ship-based tech is not effective to defend even against older DF21 MaRV. See, e.g.,

LEO SAR, hypersonics, and the death of the naval surface ship

The study concludes that air launched BGV/MaRVs could attack ships from well over 1000km. Land or ship based launch would allow even greater range. There is currently no defense against such weapons. 

Russia and PRC both have systems of this type.

Defense requires interceptor missile speeds significantly greater than that of MaRV/BGV in terminal phase. 

This is under ideal conditions where sensors function perfectly - it is just kinematics.